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Introduction: Sorai and History 
    The grandest claim for historical studies from a pre-modern Japanese surely came from 
the Confucian scholar Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728).' Sorai believed that an imaginative under-
standing of the past was essential for comprehension of the present. He wrote: "Thus, observ-
ing widely and being pervasively familiar with realities constitute what is called learning, and 
this is why learning achieves its ultimate form in history."2 
    The study of history aroused Sorai'sintense intellectual creativity and polemical reflexes. 
For him, history, rather than the pursuit of personal moral excellence or spiritual self cultiva-
tion, constituted the project of Confucian learning. It had a strongly linguistic dimension, 
for Sorai believed passionately that language itself and with it the texts that recorded the past 
were conditioned by history. He brought to the study of history the resources of a brilliant 
mind, a remarkable philological intelligence, and a mastery of Chinese sources. History was 
an extension of the imagination into the past based on Sorai's own rigorous linguistic and tex-
tual methodology. He borrowed the metaphor of "flying ears and long eyes" from an ancient 
Chinese text, the Kuan tzu.3 
    One might, on this basis, have expected Sorai to have channeled his energies into writ-
ing history himself, whether of China or of Japan. Certainly, as a young man in the employ-
ment of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (1658-1714), Sorai had participated during the years 1700-05 
in "punctuating" Chinese dynastic histories.4 It is clear that he was deeply familiar with the 
records of both the Chinese and the Japanese pasts. In fact, paradoxically, apart from mono-
graphs on discrete topics such as the ancient "well-field" system or weights and measures, 
Sorai does not seem to have been drawn to write history himself. Nonetheless, historical 
knowledge and a vivid sense of historical change permeate his written works, whether on the 
classics or his proposals for the reconstruction of his own society. 
    History for Sorai concerned the empirical study of objective "institutional changes" 
(seido no kawari) as implemented by successive regimes in China and Japan.5 But it was not a 
disinterested enquiry. It was teleological, driven by a practical and political purpose. 
      The man who desires to know the present must understand the past. He who de-
      sires to understand the past must study history. Studying history necessarily means 
     studying the records. Only when aspiration is focused on the records, will the Six 
      Classics become increasingly clear. If the Six Classics are clear,then the Way of 
      the Sages has neither past nor present. Only thereafter, will one be able to rule the 
      realm. For this reason, the chiin-tzu [superior man] always "considers history"6 and 
      therein his concern is only with concrete things.? 
    Sorai's language here and throughout his discussions of history suggests a two-fold 
agenda. History was both an object of study and the basis for political intervention in the
127
128 James MCMULLEN
present. Both aspects of Sorai's views on history have attracted serious scholarly attention 
in recent times.' Both have been recognized as fundamental to his system of thought. The 
view of two prominent scholars may be cited as examples here. In the immensely influential 
analysis of Maruyama Masao (1914-1996), Sorai was the thinker who "for the first time 
[in Japan enabled] history to develop freely"9 as an autonomous field of enquiry. With that, 
came a changed view of the role of man as a historical agent. Maruyama showed how Sorai 
achieved this by dismantling the mode of thought characteristic of the Neo-Confucianism of 
Chu Hsi (1130-1200), then ascendant in his world. This tradition saw all human activity in 
terms of a moral Way immanent in both man and nature. Sorai, by contrast, saw the Way as 
constructed by superordinate human beings in the remote past. "Only by denying the idea 
that [a naturally existing] Way itself is the ultimate source of authority ... is it possible to free 
... history for the first time from the fetters of fixed standards; only then is it possible for his-
tory to develop freely."" For Maruyama, writing from a western liberal point of view, Sorai's 
historicism opened at least the possibility of a "modern" sense of autonomous human control 
over historical change in a mode that was other than purely and directly moral. "Thus politics 
ceased to be a mere extension of the `cultivation of personal life and regulation of the family,' 
history ceased to be a `mirror' for moral precepts, and literature ceased to be an instrument 
rewarding good and punishing evil. Each acquired intrinsic normative standards."" 
    Sorai's belief in the practical relevance of history to the present has been recently ex-
plicated by Tetsuo Najita. For Najita's Sorai, history not only explains the causes of dynastic 
decline; it also "serves as the basic premise from which to once again reconstruct an order"; 
it was the basis for the political agenda of the present. Najita refers to this activity of recon-
struction and governance as "the principle of fostering human life in a social context." Sorai's 
thinking on history and politics, he claims, "reveals [him] to be a romantic and optimistic 
thinker," a quality "often denied of him by historians."" Najita evaluates Sorai's political 
thought highly. Indeed, he claims that Sorai's "ideas continue to reverberate in the discourse 
on politics in modern Japan."" 
    This essay will argue for a slightly different Sorai from that presented by many of his 
apologists in recent decades. It will explore the structure of Sorai's historical thought with 
reference to his underlying philosophical assumptions. The focus is on the internal structural 
dynamics of Sorai's thought, rather than with such broader issues as its modernity. The main 
argument is that Sorai was a historicist,14 but that his historicism, his strong conviction that 
both the institutions and language of ancient Confucianism were responsive to and deter-
mined by a constantly changing historical environment, created a version of what has been 
called the "crisis of historicism."' S Sorai's explicit solution to this problem lay, paradoxically 
in view of his historicism, in a declaration of faith in the transcendent and universal value of 
the Way of the Sages, combined with an arduous dedication to critical study in order to gain 
disciplined access to the historical manifestations and record of this Way. Certain difficulties 
resulted from this position, however, and it is argued here that Sorai supplemented these ap-
proaches with a third structural element of his thought: an appeal to a consequentialist moral-
ity, utilitarian values and a utilitarian concept of "good"; utility was the value that, in practice, 
linked the absolute and transcendent with the relative and historical. Essentially, for Sorai, 
a form of elite political utilitarianism both complemented and compensated for his radical 
historicism. In Western philosophical terms, it will be argued, Sorai rejected the deontologi-
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cal view of morality, characteristic of the Neo-Confucian world view, that sees moral actions 
as right in themselves. In its place he adopted a consequentialist morality that judges actions 
from their effects. Sorai based this utilitarian cast to his thought on his reading of Confu-
cian canonical texts, particularly the Lun yii (Analects) of Confucius (557-479 B.C.E.). His 
utilitarianism is developed further in his treatises Bendo and Benmei. It also underpins his pre-
scriptions for political action in his own present. It is pervasive in Sorai's works on contempo-
rary Japanese society and practice, Taiheisaku (Policy for great peace) and Seidan (Discourses 
on administration), and in Sorai Sensei tomonsho (Master Sorai's letters in answer to queries). 
Adopted as a philosophy of administration, it carries all the nuances of moral ambiguity criti-
cally associated with utilitarianism as a philosophy of elitist political management. 
    The essay seeks to document this utilitarian interpretation of Sorai's thought from his 
own texts. It has two main themes: Sorai's radical historicism and the utilitarianism that, in 
some sense, sprang from and complemented it. It first sketches the broad framework of the 
historical thought of Sorai's maturity with particular reference to the structural problem cre-
ated by his historicism; it next proceeds to explore his utilitarianism, primarily with reference 
to his major work of scholarship, the Rongo cho, a commentary on the Confucian Analects. 
It then turns to broader aspects of Sorai's utilitarianism, including the possibility that Sorai 
was influenced by the ancient Chinese utilitarian thought of Mo tzu (between 500 and 396 
B.C.E.). All this is not to diminish the magnitude of the achievement that Sorai's recent inter-
preters have so highly evaluated. Reassembling ancient elements to form an integrated whole 
addressed to a new historical situation requires originality scarcely less than the creation of 
radically new theories.
Sorai's "Crisis of Historicism"
    Confucians since Confucius himself had been interested in history; they always knew 
that time brought great changes in institutions and societies.' Neo-Confucians, however, 
adopted a rigorously moral approach to the past. History tended to be an exercise in retro-
spective moral judgment, ironically often largely ahistorical in its disregard of dynamic or 
developmental aspects of phenomena as they occurred in the dimension of time; it was the 
hand-maiden of an unchanging and absolute morality, the Way, that was part of the order of 
nature. Sorai himself sharply distinguished his own understanding of history from this Neo-
Confucian view. He particularly objected to that style of history that he identified with Chu 
Hsi, exemplified in Chu's own redactive work of history, the Tzu-chih tung--chien kang-mu 
(Outline and Details of the Comprehensive Mirror forAid in Government). 
     [T]he arguments presented in [this work] are like seal stamps: the form is set; the 
     principle is determined; the impression is fixed. Heaven, earth, and people are ac-
     tive phenomena, and to view them as though they were bound and tied with rope 
     is truly a useless kind of learning and merely encourages glibness. It is for this rea-
     son that the wholly factual Tzu-chih tung-chien [Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in 
     Government; the original work by Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086) from which Chu 
     Hsi's redaction was made] is far superior to Tzu chih tung chienkang-mu." 
Sorai argued, in contrast to the view that he imputed to Chu Hsi, that the Way was not a 
set of unchanging laws immanent in nature. It was man made and had, in its particularities, 
been a response to historical conditions; and it remained subject to historical change and
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adaptation: "The Way is what Yao and Shun set up, and the myriad generations depend upon 
it. However, it has aspects that change in accordance with the times. Therefore the Sage of a 
[particular] dynasty has that which he changes; he establishes this [changed version] as the 
Way and so the rulers and ministers of that dynasty enact it on this basis."" 
    If history was thus purged of rigid moral categorization and direct moral meaning, what 
then was the significance of the Confucian canon itself to a changed historical present? His 
refusal to see history as retrospective moral judgment induced in Sorai a distinctive reading 
of the Confucian classics. Sorai reconceived and historicized the Confucian canon. In his 
eyes, that corpus became no longer a repository of direct and explicit moral instruction or a 
revelation of the path to an idealized Sagehood, as it was for most Neo-Confucians. As is well 
known, Sorai shifted attention from the "Four Books" (the Analects, Mencius, Great Learning, 
and Doctrine of the Mean), works concerned to a greater or lesser extent with self cultivation 
and the moral underpinnings of action in society. He focused rather on the "Six Classics" 
(Odes, Documents, Changes, Rites, Spring andAutumn Annals, and Rites of Chou). He viewed 
these as primarily an historical record of the seminal political activity of the successive Sage 
rulers of early China. In this sense, even if not active as a historian himself, Sorai expanded 
the boundaries of history. But Sorai had done this at a cost; the moral norms that Neo-Con-
fucians had believed to be eternal and immanent were now posited as history-bound, relative 
creations. Yet this historicism, once more, raised the question of how to address the present. 
How did the past reflected in a historicized, yet still implicitly normative, Confucian canon 
relate to the changed world of eighteenth-century Japan? 
    The difficulty that Sorai's intellectualposition created is familiar, mutatis mutandis, from 
the European experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There, "the tendency 
to interpret the whole of reality, including what . . . had been conceived as absolute and 
unchanging human values, in historical, that is to say relative, terms" led, in turn, to "an 
anarchy of values." In this situation, "[m]an was cast out on a sea of flux, at the mercy of a 
mythological conception called time, reduced to the servant of values which were shown to 
be mere ideologies."" Just so, Sorai argued that the Way was a human creation, and in its 
particularities a response to historical conditions. It followed that, apart from certain com-
munal reflexes that Sorai considered natural to humans,20 the morality, and particularly the 
political morality recorded in the Confucian canon, was historically contingent. If it indeed 
retained a normative value for later ages, that value now implicitly required to be substanti-
ated and legitimated. 
    At the explicit level, Sorai responded to his "crisis of historicism" in two main ways. One 
was to reassert the traditional respect for the canon but in a changed form. Sorai concentrated 
on the person of the Sages themselves and the Way that they had created. As though to com-
pensate for any weakening that his historicism might suggest and to bolster the authority of 
the Way, he proclaimed that, paradoxically, the Sages' abilities and the Way that they created 
transcended time. The Way "had no past or present." Sorai insisted that it was relevant to his 
own or any present. 21 In his Benmei, he wrote: "If the teachings of the Sages were not to ac-
cord with what is right for the present age, then they would not be Sages. Therefore.... the 
teachings of the Sages span ten thousand ages and possess a quality that cannot be changed."22 
Elsewhere, in his Tomonsho, Sorai elevated his attitude to the level of a declaration of faith 
in the Sages comparable to faith in the Buddha.23 But he proceeded further still to claim a
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sanctified, indeed religious, status for the Way. "The Sage emperors and enlightened kings 
all modeled their actions on Heaven in ordering the realm; they served Heaven and thereby 
enacted their administration and teaching."24 As a result, "the Sages' achievement was like 
Heaven; therefore, they are correlated (p'ei) with Heaven". 25 This relationship between the 
Sages and Heaven, the sacred power ordering the world, however, was based on the Sages' 
special powers, for Sorai conceived of Heaven as inaccessible to ordinary human understand-
ing.26 
    Sorai's sacralization of the Way was surely motivated in part by his anti-Neo-Confucian 
polemic. For, as Maruyama so incisively pointed out, Sorai's Confucian revisionism required 
him to refute the "rationality" of Sung philosophy and the system of "rational" self-cultiva-
tion leading to Sagehood that it underpinned.27 Sorai's doctrine of the unknowability of 
Heaven achieved both this but, more importantly in the present context, also the related aim 
of enhancing the status of an historicized Way. At the same time, secondly and from a differ-
ent direction, but again as though to enhance the grandeur of the Confucian project and to 
deny the Neo-Confucian view that self-cultivation was a duty of all students of the Way, Sorai 
declared that an arduous, highly specialized, even life-long dedication to critical and empiri-
cal study was necessary in order to gain disciplined access to this object of faith. 
    In effect, however, Sorai's two-fold approach to his "crisis of historicism" can be said 
merely to have deferred the problem. Sorai's paradoxical assumptions concerning the status 
of the Way begged the further question of the precise nature of the object of faith and the 
appropriate focus and method of study. 28 Did the Sages' legacy consist of an objective set of 
institutions, somehow and to a greater or lesser extent to be adjusted to later times? Or was 
it a state of mind in the student to be inculcated from study of their texts? Or was it simply a 
religious obedience to Heaven? What, precisely, should the student of Confucianism study? 
How was the legacy, once recovered, to be seen to be coherent and legitimate? 
    This problem has been reflected in disagreementamong modern scholars as to whether, 
for Sorai, the canon provided a set of objective methods to be studied and applied by the 
inaugurators of later regimes, or whether it yielded something more subjective, what Tahara 
Tsuguo (b. 1924) describes as the "autonomous spirit of the Former Kings" in creating the 
Way?29 Sorai himself seems to speak with two voices. On the one hand, as Tahara has argued, 
he seems to view the objective, historical institutions themselves as normative; in other words 
to be some sort of restoratio nist.30 Thus Sorai referred to the Book of Odes and the Book of 
Documents as "a repository of propriety" (i chih fu).31 He defined i precisely as an objective 
subset of ritual: it was "the appropriate" or "propriety"; it "regulated affairs" and "responded 
to change."32 This suggested that these works indeed contained objective institutions for regu-
lating affairs. In Taiheisaku, again, learning is described in terms of objective and comparative 
enquiry: 
     The person of great capacity, when, through the way of "flying ears and long eyes," 
      he sees the contrasts between the institutions of the sagesof old, the institutions of 
      the Han, Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties, the institutions of our country in the 
      remote past and its present-day institutions, what the past lacked and the present 
      has and the past had but the present lacks are patently obvious. So the make-up of 
      the present is apparent. When the make-up of the present is apparent, the site of 
      the illness is evident."
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Why not, then, elucidate the institutions of the past directly from the canonical texts? Why 
not write an appropriate commentary on the Book of Documents? But Sorai did not do this. 
The Sorai scholar Imanaka Kanji (b. 1913), confronting this problem, fumbled with the sug-
gestions that "even a great scholar like Sorai" could have been discouraged by the enormity of 
the task, or was simply disinclined to undertake it, or may have keenly regretted his inability 
to do so." Perhaps also Sorai's own realistic sense of his own society may have inhibited him 
from pursuing too facile or fundamentalist an agenda of restorationism. However, in his 
proposals for the reconstruction of his own society embodied in his late Seidan, for instance, 
Sorai did go some distance to deriving certain general objective "great principles" from the 
Confucian canon.
      So we find that the way to relieve the poverty of high and low is not particularly 
     miraculous or mystical; it is merely a matter of applyingthe methods of the ancient 
      sages..... When we ask how to achieve this, we find that the great principles . .       
. behind the teachings of the ancient Sages was that all people, high and low, be 
     attached to the land and, on that basis, that the institutions (seido) of ritual laws be 
      established. These were the great principles of good government." 
Yet Sorai seems to have gone little further than this in distilling objective political wisdom 
from the classics. 
    On the other hand, he seemed also to entertain a different, more subjective approach. 
This was based on the premise that study of the canon produced a state of mind that qualified 
the subject to make the correct political or moral choices for his own time. In Sorai's world, 
there were two possible routes to this end. The first was based on the conventional assump-
tion that the mind of the Sages was accessible, and that, by gaining access to it through the 
discipline of self-cultivation, the student of the Way could attain a Sagely ability to respond 
to his own world. This approach was found among Neo-Confucian thinkers. It was particu-
larly strongly represented by the subjectivist "School of Mind" and pre-eminently by Wang 
Yang-ming (1473-1529) in China, whom Sorai condemned precisely on this count.36 I  t e 
previous generation in Japan, this approach had been pursued particularly in the "Shingaku" 
(Learning of the mind) of Nakae Toju (1608-48) and Kumazawa Banzan (1619-91). Sorai, 
however, had a profound distaste for self-cultivation, and vehemently rejected the Neo-Con-
fucian view that Sagehood could be achieved through learning.37 He was usually most reluc-
tant to concede that the minds of Sages were directly accessible to their latter-day followers. 
Indeed, he seems often to have wished to limit the understanding of the "mind" of the Sages to 
Sages themselves. Thus in Benmei, he wrote: "The virtue [of the Sages] is spiritually illumined 
and unmeasurable; how can it be successfully glimpsed?"38 Under these circumstances, the 
mind-set of the Sages was not a concern for students of the tradition. "To discuss the Sages in 
terms of their minds is not the intention of the school of Confucius" (VIII/181313501672).39 
However, Sorai occasionally seemed to draw back from this approach. In Benmei, writing of 
Confucius' discussion of ritual with his disciples, Sorai wrote: " . . . in one or two instances, 
through Confucius' discussion with his disciples, one can discern the mind of creating."40 In 
fact, Sorai seems ambivalent on whether, or to what extent, ordinary men can attain to the 
"mind" or "virtue" of the Sages." 
    Sorai's more frequent approach, however, was to emphasize that study led to a more 
modest change internal to the mind of the student, rather than a direct access to the mind of
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the Sages themselves. Sorai described this change as a spontaneous or "natural," unself con-
scious conversion resulting from sustained effort: " [I] f the student follows the teachings of 
the Sages well and with all his will, learns them over a long period, and is converted to them 
(yu chih hua),42 he will then and then only perceive that the teachings of the Sages span ten 
thousand ages and cannot be changed."43 
    At the outset of Taiheisaku Confucian learning is depicted as a time-consuming "shift" 
(i) in the subject: 
     TheWay of learning is entered through study of poetry and prose in the vernacular, 
     acquiring knowledge of foreign language; by learning history, becoming aware of 
     differences in the institutions and manners of successive ages; through learning 
     the books of remote antiquity, becoming aware of differences in the languages of 
     past and present, and by steeping one's mind in the Six Classicsbecoming familiar 
     with the teachings of the Sages. When one does these things, as one learns and is 
      steeped in their language and their acts, at no one particular time one's own men-
     tality (kokoroawai), too, progressively shifts (utsuriyuki) and the operations of one's 
     wisdom spontaneously becomes consistent with the Way of the Sages. Thereafter, 
     when one looks at the state of the present world, the wayof ordering the realm and 
     state becomes like pointing at the palm of one's hand. However, this is the learn-
     ing of Confucianists, and when one does not devote a lifetime of energy to it, is 
     something difficult to achieve.44 
    Here, it is true, there is no claim to appropriating the minds of the Sages. None the 
less, logically speaking, some understanding of the motives and rationale behind the objective 
institutions of the Way, some intellectual assimilation to the thinking behind the institutions 
of the Sages, is implied. 
    Thus, though Sorai entertains both the objective and the subjective approaches to study 
of the "rituals of the Former Kings," he develops neither beyond a certain point. It is true that, 
intuitively and practically, his formula for study and recovery of the Way possesses cogency; it 
suggested an intelligible agenda that it was possible to follow. To borrow Kate Nakai's words, 
the "records of the institutions of the ancient kings" provided "exemplary models-in con-
temporary parlance, . . . case studies" that could be studied.45 Yet, at crucial points, it is also 
undeniable that Sorai's solution to the crisis of historicism is obscure, irrational, ambivalent 
or even mystical. The very concepts of "faith" and of a transcendent Way seem more reli-
gious than philosophical. Heaven, invoked by Sorai as the basis and sanction of the activity 
of Sages, is also, self-consciously for Sorai, an intellectually inaccessible concept. And the 
achievement of understanding in the student is described in terms such as "naturally" and "at 
no particular time," that also put it beyond the reach of rational analysis and seem intended 
to emphasize its elusive quality. 
    Thus there seems to be a suspension of rationality at the heart of Sorai's thought, an 
uneasy space, a no man's land between knower and known, an ambiguity between subject and 
object. Sorai's polemical desire to reject Neo-Confucian rationality and to enhance the tran-
scendent status of the Way can thus be seen to have confronted him with a complex impasse. 
This situation was a consequence of a worldview that sought to combine a radically historicist 
view of the canonical sources of a given tradition with the belief that the same canon also
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contained a transcendent element normative for the present. On the one hand, Sorai postu-
lated a relative, history-bound yet also in some sense normative set of institutions created, 
so he argued, by superordinate, unknowable figures, sanctioned in turn by the unknowable 
power of Heaven and recorded in a canonical corpus of texts. On the other hand, he denied 
the legitimacy of attempting to gain access to, or emulate, the minds that had created these 
institutions. Put in more abstract terms, Sorai's intellectual position faced him with a version 
of the age-old problem of the interface between the absolute and the relative, of deriving 
relative imperatives (actions in historical time) from an authority claimed to be absolute or 
transcendent (the Way of the Sages). How was this absolute, transcendent Way to be acces-
sible and implemented in relative time once the Sages had departed and the Way itself lost? 
Sorai does not, of course, address this problem in precisely these terms.46 Yet the question of 
access to the Way and its implementation in his present can be argued to be salient among the 
problems that he confronted as a Confucian scholar. Here, indeed, was Sorai's own particular 
"crisis of historicism." This difficulty, it could be argued, exposed a fault line in his thinking. 
    The space created by Sorai's radical revisionist historicization of the canonical sources of 
Confucianism was filled not only by his declaration of faith combined with arduous empirical 
study and a process of conversion of the student. In addition, the structural need for a link 
between the absolute or transcendent Way and its relative applications inspired the develop-
ment of a third pillar of his system. Sorai identified within the Confucian canon a utilitarian 
mode of thought based on the concepts of "profit" (Ii) and of "good" (shan). According to this 
mode the actions of those in political authority were determined by their consequences, ir-
respective of the moral state of mind of their authors. For Sorai, this mode of thinking solved 
the paradox and the methodological difficulty inherent in his thought. It also provided the 
essential link between the Way of the Former Kings and the governments of later ages. 
    As a Confucian, a follower of a scholastic tradition, Sorai inevitably felt required to 
justify this position from canonical sources. He believed that Confucius himself, properly and 
historically understood, had subscribed to a utilitarian approach, and that this approach was 
recorded in the canonical Lun yii. This essay proceeds to discuss Sorai's revisionist historical 
and utilitarian reading of that work. First, however, a historical and cultural context is pro-
vided by a brief glance at the utilitarian mode of thought itself and its following in East Asia 
before the time of Ogyu Sorai.
Elite Utilitarianism and Government, in West and East
    Utilitarianism is a mode of thinking according to which the moral status of actions is 
based on their consequences. In particular, those actions that maximize well-being are judged 
to be morally good. "Well-being" is variously defined as an absence of pain, or, in a more 
positive direction, satisfaction of desire. A utilitarian "use[s] `right' and `wrong' to appraise 
choices on account of their actual success in promoting the general happiness."47 Utilitar-
ian morality contrasts with alternative types of moral thought that regard moral imperatives 
as deriving authority from elsewhere than from their direct consequences. Such alternative 
theories are "absolutist" if they prescribe that a moral imperative must be obeyed whatever 
its consequences; or "deontological" from the Greek word for "that which is binding," if they 
postulate that acts are intrinsically right or wrong in themselves.
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    Utilitarian moral thought is likely to be unconcerned with certain aspects of the subject. 
"Acts are not right or obligatory because of their inherent character, their underlying motives, 
or their relation to divine or social dictates, but because of how much overall human or sen-
tient well-being they produce."48 Yet utilitarianism may also hold that certain mind-sets may 
be more favorable than others to determining actions conducive to widespread well-being. 
It seems likely to stress empirical knowledge. The capacity to know the likely outcome of 
actions is likely to increase a subject's ability to act morally in the utilitarian sense. From the 
perspective of elite political management, knowledge of history is likely to dispose rulers to be 
aware of the consequences of their actions, and thus to take informed measures to maximize 
the well-being of their subjects. A further characteristic of utilitarianism as a social or political 
philosophy may also be noted at this stage. In so far as it identifies morality with maximiz-
ing utility, "any means can be justified by a good-enough end."49 Such means might include 
the destruction of human life. Hence it is difficult to subsume utilitarianism in its direct or 
simple form under the kind of humanism that accepts that all individual human beings are 
equally ends in themselves.50 
    Utilitarianism as a systematic moral philosophy is particularly associated with the Eng-
lish Utilitarians Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Its basis in 
a consequentialist view of morality has a simple structure, however, and can be identified in 
other intellectual and moral traditions. In approaching Sorai's utilitarianism, it will be help-
ful to set his ideas in historical perspective through a brief glance at the Chinese tradition in 
terms of the basic distinction between consequentialist or "utilitarian" and "deontological" 
morality. For long before Sorai's time, a utilitarian view of morality had been the subject of 
debate in East Asia. In this sense, Sorai's utilitarian views are sited in an ancient controversy 
whose concepts were already familiar to students of the East Asian tradition. 
    The mainstream of the Confucian tradition tended historically to be deontological or 
even absolutist rather than utilitarian. Although, for instance in addressing moral dilemmas, 
Confucians did resort to consequentialist arguments, they were inclined to express disdain 
for actions directly motivated by a quest for benefit, especially of the material sort , for self 
or society. Discussion was conducted, more often than not, in terms of the contrasting values 
of "profit" (li) and "righteousness" (i). For Confucians, "profit" was at most legitimate only 
when subordinate to, and a by-product of, "righteousness." It was not an acceptable end in it-
self. "`Ihe man, who in the view of profit thinks of righteousness.... may be called a complete 
man."51 "The Master said, The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousnesss; the 
mind of the mean man is conversant with profit."52 When questioned by King Hui of Liang 
about "counsels to profit (li) my kingdom," Mencius (371-289 B.C.E.) indignantly replied, 
"Wh
y must your Majesty use that word ` profit'? What I am provided with, are counsels to be-
nevolence and righteousness, and these are my only topics."53 Chu Hsi Neo-Confucians were 
even more emphatic, even absolutist, in their moral thinking." Their elaborate metaphysics 
underpinned moral values as binding in themselves; no doubt their Buddhist-influenced as-
ceticism also inhibited them from a direct maximization of material benefits. The Chin-ssu lu 
(Reflections on things at hand) contained the following well-known quotation from the Han 
dynasty philosopher Tung Chung-shu (177-104 B.c.E.): "Rectify moral principles and do not 
seek profit. Illuminate the Way and do not calculate on results."55 Wang Yang-ming spoke 
even more categorically of the "poison of the doctrine of success and profit."56
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    It must be noted, however, that some texts important to Confucians, notably the 
Changes, played down the conflict between "righteousness" and "profit." "What is called 
`
profit' is the harmony of all that is right."57 Even Mencius, though strongly anti-utilitarian, 
could define "good" (shan), a moral value, in terms of what people desire. His statement that: 
"The desirable is what is meant by the `good"' (k'o yu chih wei shan) suggests a utilitarian 
assumption that "good" is to be defined in terms of satisfaction of the wants of men, an es-
sentially utilitarian position." Furthermore, a utilitarian emphasis has been identified within 
the Confucian tradition itself. Hsiin tzu (ca. 350-286 B.C.E.) is noted particularly for his 
belief in the primacy of man-made institutions as a means for achieving social regeneration.59 
However, Benjamin Schwartz (1916-1999), for instance, while first conceding that "Hsiin 
tzu's ethic seems to be essentially utilitarian,"60 later concludes that his "ethic of the noble 
man is not utilitarian." As Schwartz sees it, Hsiin tzu's "devotion" to rites and music "seems 
to carry him well beyond his appreciation of their social function .1161 Hsiin tzu is in fact ul-
timately interested in the moral regeneration of individuals for its own sake in a way foreign 
to a thoroughly utilitarian view. Nonetheless, Hsiin tzu is frequently cited as an influence on 
Sorai, and it will be necessary to return to him later in this essay. 
    There were, however, more radical, independent traditions of thought in China that 
have a claim to be considered "utilitarian." Outside what is normally considered "philoso-
phy," the writings of military thinkers were founded, of course, on assumptions concerning 
human conduct that were radically realist and instrumental, a mode in some ways congruent 
with utilitarianism. They were destined to be particularly influential in Japan. Their possible 
influence on Sorai is discussed below. But a more philosophical utilitarianism, associated with 
political management, was also found among the ancient schools of thought in China. In pre-
Ch'in philosophy, a utilitarian approach is represented classically by Mo tzu. "[T]he Mohists 
are ... vigorous independent thinkers who submit all traditional morality to the test of social 
utility, explicitly defend innovation, and support the new kind of centralized state, with merit 
rather than birth as the grounds for preferment."62 Utilitarianism, again of the political vari-
ety, has also been identified later in Chinese history. A group of scholars in the Sung dynasty, 
who in the view of some scholars influenced Sorai, criticized Chu Hsi style Neo-Confucian-
ism (Tao-hsueh) on the basis of "utilitarian" assumptions. The "Yung-chia" thinker Yeh Shih 
(1150-1223) showed a "utilitarian" lack of interest in the moral state of mind of individu-
als. He attacked the mysticism of his Tao-hsueh contemporaries and "relegated the quest for 
sagehood to the background."63 "The way of learning," rather, "was not abstract reasoning or 
contemplation, but unremitting attention to concrete facts, both natural and man-made."64 
Another Sung utilitarian was Ch'en Liang (1143-94), whose "Yung-k'ang" learning argued 
that success in government rendered nugatory the traditional Confucian distinctions between 
"king" and "hegemon" and "righteousnesss" and "profit." Provided a ruler achieved success 
in government, he was at once a Confucian moral ruler and a "hegemon" who achieved 
"
profit."65 According to Ch'en's biographer, "in [his] eyes, that which possessed utility-that 
is satisfied the reasonable desires and needs of the people and was advantageous to the greater 
good of society and state-validated its own correctness."66 These claims to identify utilitarian 
thought in the Chinese intellectual tradition are important, for they suggest possible sources 
for Sorai's own style of political utilitarianism.
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Rongo cho 
    Of his Rongo chi (The Analects Attested), Sorai wrote that it "required the expenditure 
of a lifetime of effort,"67 and it has been recognized as the prime source for the thought of his 
school." The work is, first, the product of great learning, a lively and incisive mind, a vivid 
historical imagination and a passionate commitment to the study of the Chinese language. 
The commentary has been found to draw eclectically on a wide range of sources.69 These 
encompass the Han dynasty commentarial tradition; the later shu (sub-commentaries) of Hs-
ing Ping (931-1010); the Chi chu (Collected Annotations) of Chu Hsi, the Lun yii ta-ch'iian 
(Compendium on the Analects), a Ming compendium of Neo-Confucian commentaries, and 
the Rongo kogi (Ancient Meaning of the Analects) of Sorai's fellow countryman, Ito Jinsai 
(1627-1705). Other sources were the commentary attributed to the T'ang scholar Han Yii 
(768-824) and that by Yang Shen (1488-1549) of the Ming dynasty. Sorai engages critically 
with this long commentarial tradition with great panache, confidently selecting between ri-
val glosses and interpretations. Usually, for philological and his own polemical reasons, he 
preferred the "ancient commentaries" on the grounds that they still preserved the semantic 
usages of Confucius' time. Sometimes, however, when his own exegetical purposes suited 
him, he found in favor of Chu Hsi.70 He offered syntactical as well as lexical revisions and 
cited epigraphical and phonological evidence. He was particularly alert to Confucius' use of 
popular sayings. He confidently identified both lacunae and interpolations. He explained in 
his preface that the Analects was not a text (wen)- from the hand of Confucius himself. It did 
not record Confucius' actual words (tz'u) but his "speech" or "discourse" (yen). It had been 
written down by disciples simply as an aide memoire. These disciples had had different levels 
of ability (3/7-8/370). Sorai generalized that those passages which recorded question and an-
swer among disciples all represented the respondent as correct: "this is merely the intention of 
the recorder" (XIX,3/4/330/678). His lively sense of the historical and social context of from 
which the Analects originated even enabled Sorai to restore humor and irony to the text.71 
Thus Sorai explored the dynamics of the compilation of the Analects and brought it to life. 
His thorough historicization of the text encompassed not only its language but also changes 
in social and economic life that affected understanding. 
    Sorai's bracing critical spirit extended to broader exegesis. Informing his reading was a 
polemical desire to purge the Analects of distortions that he believed had been imposed by 
an erroneous exegetical tradition, chiefly represented by the Sung Confucians and, nearer at 
hand, by Ito Jinsai. These men were guilty of philological and historical ignorance. Many 
Neo-Confucian doctrines reflected the Zen Buddhism that had been ascendant in the Sung 
(IV,15/3/178/511). But Neo-Confucian interpreters of the text had also labored under the 
influence of Mencius and of the heterodoxies of Taoism and Buddhism. Philologically, they 
read the text on the basis of the Chinese grammar of times since the T'ang dynasty scholars, 
Han Yii and Liu Tsung-yiian (773-819) (VIII,6/3/336/658). As a result of these failings, 
they deflected the text from its historical meaning in a number of directions. Their most bla-
tant inadequacy lay in a fundamental misreading of the objective, institutional, and political 
character of the Confucian Way. Unhistorically, they regarded the Analects as concerned with 
personal self-cultivation (1,9/3/39/395). They also imposed doctrines such as the Mencian 
theory that human nature was good, that Confucianism was concerned with enlightenment,
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and that men could learn to become Sages (I,113/15-6/375-6), though these were remote 
from Confucius' own historical concerns. As a result they made the text metaphysical, con-
cerned with a hypostatized "substance of the Way" (tao-t'i) (IX,10/4/21/383).72 They imposed 
the doctrine of "substance and function" (ti yung) and pursued the achievement of a Taoistic 
"Sagely within and kingly without" (nei-sheng wai-wang) state of mind (I,2/3/24/382).73 
    The person of Confucius himself, Sorai insisted, must be viewed historically. This ap-
plied at the level of close commentary on the text. Thus commenting on the saying that "The 
Master fished but did not use a net; he shot, but not at birds perching," Sorai argued that 
the reading of later scholars that this saying reflected Confucius' "humanity" had been overly 
influenced by Mencian interpretations of benevolence and the teaching that "the superior 
man... keeps away from his slaughter-house and cook-room."74 But Confucius' conduct 
here was a question of ritual practice rather than of moral attitude. Anciently, the common 
people had used nets and had shot perching fowl; the elites of emperor and feudal princes, by 
contrast, had personally hunted to make offerings for sacrifice and for guests. They had done 
this as a gesture of respect and without primary interest in taking the quarry itself. However, 
since Confucius' time there had taken place a historical shift to a market economy. Respect 
towards sacrifice and to guests was now demonstrated by paying a high price for offerings in 
the market place, rather than by hunting in person. Imprisoned in their own history, later 
commentators had lost sight of the historical meaning of the passage (VII,26/3/307-8/632). 
    But Sorai's historicization operated also at a grander level. He placed Confucius himself 
in a wider historical context. Broadly, Sorai assumed, history was characterized by cycles of 
dynastic decline and renovation; but it had experienced three broader phases. The early history 
of mankind had seen the activity of Sages such as Fu Hsi, Shen Nung, and the Yellow Emperor 
(VIII,19/3/354/675). These men did not invent political institutions.75 They had taught the 
basic technology of human life, "profit and convenience and the securing abundant means 
of sustentation" (li yung hou-sheng) .76 The second stage had been the creation of administra-
tive institutions to "pacify the people" (IV,15/3/179/512), through the invention of political 
control in the form of "rites and music." This was the achievement of the seven historical 
Sages-Yao, Shun, YE, Tang, Wen, Wu and the duke of Chou (XIV40/4/209/564)-whose 
activities and institutions were recorded in the Six Classics. Heaven had endowed them with 
transcendent "hearing, seeing, comprehension, and knowing" beyond what could be learnt. 
Historically, they had all been "founding rulers of states" (VI,28/3/270/596). It was their su-
perordinate ability in creating institutions to "order the realm" that defined them as Sages in 
the full sense. In so doing, they had been constrained by, or "respected," Heaven (T'ien) and 
had "received the Decree of Heaven (T ien-ming)" (1,1/3/13/375). But, Sorai constantly em-
phasized, the Way that they created was wholly objective, political, and institutional, devoted 
to "pacifying the people." It had nothing to do with personal moral and spiritual regenera-
tion as an end in itself. At the same time, in its particularities, it remained relative, subject to 
historical change and adaptation. The achievement of the Sages had been cumulative. "The 
way of the ancient Sages could not be established by a single Sage" (VII,1 /3/277/601). In-
deed, Sorai emphasized that there were no ritual institutions "unchanging for ten thousand 
ages" (XV,10/4/231-2/584); each of the Sages had created a system in response to historical 
conditions.
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    King Wu, founder of the Chou dynasty, had been the last of the full Sage founders of a 
regime. During the Spring and Autumn period, the ancient rituals still survived. But by the 
Ch'in and Han, in the third stage of human history, all "legal regulations" with respect to 
"dress and utensils" had become lost (VI,23/3/260/587). Since the time of Shang Yang (d. 
338 B.C.E.), the state had been dominated by Legalists; since the Sung Neo-Confucianists, 
by "the School of Reason" (VI,3/3/240/568). Or, as Sorai saw it, since the T'ang and Sung 
dynasties, the Way had become misrecognized and conflated with personal virtue rather than 
with objective institutions (VII,1/3/278/601). 
    Against this long perspective, Confucius had been born at the end of the middle phase, 
during a time of decline "at the end of Chou" (3/3/367). At this time, the monarchical, 
autocratic power on which Sagely government rested had deteriorated. "The Way of Chou 
had declined, and rites, music, and military chastisement did not proceed from the Son of 
Heaven, but lay with feudal lords" (VIII,4/3/332/654).77 Sorai characterized this period as 
"a time of change in the Decree" (XV,10/4/231/584), and a "time for creating [new rites and 
music]" (XI,1/4/100/451). This period could, if Heaven had permitted it, have witnessed the 
activities of a Sage in instituting new rites and music. Confucius, Sorai believed, was qualified 
by ability, learning, and understanding of his Sagely predecessors to perform this task. Sorai 
took Confucius' claim of himself that "My studies lie low and my penetration rises high" to 
refer to "learning the poetry, documents, rites, and music of the Former Kings and reaching 
to the minds of the Former Kings" (XIV,37/4/207-8/562). Moreover, referring to Confucius' 
difficulty in "attesting" the rituals of the Hsia and Yin (Shang), Sorai declared: "Probably 
Confucius perceived and knew the mind with which the Sages created rites and music, and 
had masterly knowledge of human feelings and historical change. Therefore, although the 
rituals of Hsia and Yin did not survive, by grasping merely one or two he inferred the rest as 
though looking at them in the palm of his hand" (III,9/3/114/459).78 
    But Confucius had not been favored with the role of full creator Sage. "Heaven, in 
commissioning Confucius, did so through transmitting the Way of the Former Kings to 
later generations and did not let him put the Way into practice in his own age. This was 
because Heaven knew Confucius" (XIV,37/4/207/562). Confucius thus "did not obtain the 
rank that he deserved, did not practice his Way in the realm, and ended his life as a com-
mon man" (3/9/371). In this sense Confucius had not been a full creator Sage, but "through 
his virtue and project (ye), he is to be classified with creator Sages" (VI,2813/270-1/596). 
Indeed, Confucius had actually prepared himself for the task of creation. He had indicated 
broadly the form which, in those historical circumstances, his own ritual institutions would 
have taken; he would have "mostly followed Chou" (111,14/3/126/469). Moreover, he had, 
as Sorai saw it, at the very end of his life, tried actively to intervene to create the opportunity 
of realizing his own Sagely ideals. He had advised the ineffectual Duke Ai of Lu to attack 
the powerful neighboring state of Ch'i, following the assassination of Duke Chien, and so to 
achieve hegemony over the whole of China and create a situation in which a Sage might arise 
(XN,22/4/ 196-8/550-1).79 
    Frustrated, during the final phase of his life, Confucius had devoted his efforts to teach-
ing and to documenting the Way of the Former Kings. His main achievement had been the 
compilation of the Six Classics. He had gathered together for the first time the material for,
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rather than, as later Confucians believed, merely edited, the canon. "[B]efore Confucius there 
had been no Six Classics.... Confucius wandered round the four directions and his quest 
[for material] became detailed. Thereafter his disciples transmitted the books.... Therefore, 
though Yao, Shun, Yd, Tang, Wen, and Wu might have existed, had there been no Confucius, 
their Way would have been destroyed" (IX,14/4/29-30/390). The compilation of the canon, 
rather than any exemplary personal or moral achievement, constituted Confucius' contribu-
tion to history and the Way. The Analects, as the record of Confucius' discourse, was thus 
supplementary and secondary to Six Classics, the main repository of the Way. It shed light on 
the task of students who, like Confucius himself, had been denied the opportunity to imple-
ment the Way directly. The Way, properly understood, remained an unremittingly political 
project, and, for Sorai, the Analects was a book exclusively focused on political management 
and institutions. Historically, he believed, "most of Confucius' utterances were made for rul-
ers" (IX,17/4/35/394); equally, "in general, ritual is preponderantly [the subject] spoken of 
in the Analects" (XIV,24/4/200/553). 
    For Sorai,Confucius was thus a liminal figure. He had access to, but could not himself 
"create," the Way of the Former Kings. Sorai's historicization of Confucius cut his status 
down to that of a fallible, frustrated human being, albeit a more real and in some ways more 
compelling figure than the Confucius of Confucian or Neo-Confucian hagiography. Confu-
cius himself was no longer a personal or moral paragon. Sorai criticized the attitude that "does 
not want to learn what Confucius learnt [namely, the Way], but wants to learn Confucius" 
(3/8/370). Sorai had stripped him of any claim to be a pre-eminent teacher of self-cultivation, 
let alone of metaphysics. The central figure, inspirer, and legitimator of the cultural tradition 
had been shorn of his metaphysical and mystical aura. The "uncrowned king" (su-wang) of 
later Confucian tradition, celebrated by Mencius as the greatest man who had ever lived,80 
was effectively dethroned." In a similar direction, the Analects, extolled by Ito Jinsai as "the 
highest and ultimate book of the universe,"82 was reduced essentially to the status of a work 
of secondary importance, ancillary to the more valuable and concrete Six Classics. 
    The Analects, thus historicized like its central figure, was also a liminal text. Why then 
did Sorai choose to make it the subject of his life's work? One reason must surely have been 
the sinological challenge of commenting on this most read of Confucian classics; the text of 
this work provided spectacular scope for the exercise and display of disciplined philological 
learning that was so dear to Sorai. But there is another reason that provides direct support 
for the argument of this essay. For the Analects, in Sorai's revisionist interpretation, provided 
neither an objective account of the institutions of the Way, nor did it engage in discussion of 
self-cultivation. Rather, it addressed precisely the middle ground between subject and object 
brought to the fore by Sorai's "crisis of history." Properly understood, it revealed the true val-
ues informing the discourse of a man who, though he himself understood the minds or values 
of the Former Kings, had yet been denied the opportunity to objectify them in practice. And 
those values were, it will be shown, rational, coherent, and common to all good political ac-
tion; they linked past and present. They were the values of "profit" and of utilitarianism.
Profit 
    In the ancient Chinese tradition, it was suggested above, a utilitarian mode of thought 
was symbolized by the concept of "profit." Sorai sought to show that, far from an illegitimate 
concept, "profit" had been built into Confucianism from the beginning. He found Confu-
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cius' most direct endorsement of the utilitarian position in the verse: "The subjects of which 
the Master seldom spoke were - profit, the Decree and benevolence." 
    Sorai rejected both the ancient and Neo-Confucian interpretations of this passage. The 
verse, he argued, should rather be read: "When Confucius spoke of profit, he invariably 
put the Decree and benevolence with it. He did not speak very much of profit alone." This 
was because "profit" was contingent on both the Decree (namely, the inscrutable power of 
Heaven) and a benevolent administration. Confucius had wished to guard against a superfi-
cial pursuit of "small" (that is, selfish or sectional) profit alone, which could be harmful." It 
was not that he disapproved of profit itself. In fact, there was nothing more profitable to the 
realm than "the way of pacifying the people." Material welfare, "profit and convenience and 
the securing abundant means of sustentation" (li yung hou-sheng), had constituted two of the 
"three businesses" of the Sage emperor Shun." Profit, in fact, was built into the Way of the 
Sages: "The Sages' wisdom was great and their thought profound; they were well aware of 
wherein lay the "true profit (chen-li). So they established the Way for later ages and caused it 
to be to practised accordingly." (DC, 1/4/4/368)The Changes spoke of "[the Way being] able 
with its admirable profit to profit all the realm. How it profits is not told, but how great it 
is."85 The Great Learning quoted the saying: "In a state, profit is not considered profit; propri-
ety (i) is considered profit."86 
    Mencius, in his famous royal audience with King Hui of Liang, had overdrawn the 
distinction between "propriety" and "profit" for factional purposes, untrue to Confucius' 
teachings. He had wished to refute the prevalent utilitarian (kung-li) schools of his day.87 
Even he, however, had spoken of the superior man enjoying "tranquillity, wealth, honour and 
glory."88 "If these are not profit, what are they?" "If the Way does not profit the people, how 
is it worth calling the Way?" "It was only the morally uninformed, partial understanding of 
profit that Confucius was reluctant to speak of. Thus it is not the case that the Sages hated 
profit." Later Confucians had been misled by the moralizing of the concept of rightness and 
the doctrines of "Heavenly principle and human desire." Their rejection of profit had brought 
them close to Buddhist or Taoist style asceticism, and to "withering to death in the hills and 
forests" (IX,1/4/3-6/367-9). 
    But Sorai's identification of a utilitarian mode of thought in the Analects went deeper 
than his positive reading of Confucius' explicit discussion of the concept of "profit." Sorai sys-
tematically shifted exegetical focus away from matters of self-cultivation and the state of mind 
of the student of the Way that were the concern of much Neo-Confucian exegesis of this text. 
As already quoted, in true utilitarian spirit, he was unconcerned with the state of mind of the 
founders of the tradition. "To discuss the Sages in terms of their minds is not the intention 
of the school of Confucius" (VIII/18/3/350/672). He interpreted the cardinal Confucian 
virtues not as ends in themselves or as subjective virtues, but for their utility in achieving 
order in society. This represents a systemic shift from a deontological to a consequentialist 
view of morality. Benevolence, the cardinal Confucian value, was "the virtue that pacifies the 
people" (111,3/3/101/448). It was evaluated, indeed defined, in terms of the achievement of 
the "profit" in implementation to which it was properly directed. The following passage hints 
at an awareness, at least in negative terms, of the utilitarian's "felicific calculus." 
     One may state that benevolence is the virtue of pacifying the people and presiding 
      over men.89 ... But the people are many! If you do this, you damage that; if you be-
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(IV,16/3/ 183/515).91 
    Thus all aspects of the Way, including all virtues, were functional and teleological, di-
rected to "pacifying the people." This objective, in turn could be subsumed under the rubric 
of "profit." Profit was implemented by, rather than contradictory to, "benevolence." Sorai 
accorded this concept a centrality in his thought quite foreign to the spirit of mainstream 
Confucian thinking.92 It was an essential goal of government, an end to which the virtues and 
institutions of the Way of the Former Kings were directed. "Why should even a superior man 
not desire profit?" he asked rhetorically (IV,16/3/184/516).93
 stow on this party, then the other is resentful.... Although one may do something, 
 assuming that it is for the profit of the people, yet there are not a few cases where it 
 will produce harm where one is not aware of it. Therefore the enacting of benevo-
 lence by the benevolent man is always regarded as difficult. (XII,3/4/ 134/484) 
The same goals applied to the objective, institutional aspects of the Way. Here, So-
eclaimed as objective institutions concepts interpreted as psychological dispositions or 
es in the Mencian and Neo-Confucian tradition of Confucianism. "R tual
ept in Sorai's system, was not an end in itself, but explicitly instrumental and goal-di-
d. "Rituals are the instruments of the Former Kings to order the state. This means that 
set        rituals up to order the state. Thus if one cannot order the state by means of `the 
plaisanceproper to the rules of                                 then what use do the rituals of the Former 
s serve?" (IU,13/3/177/510). Again, the "propriety" (i) with which "ritual" was often 
d  was an objective institution rather than, as the Neo-Confucians interpreted it 
M     asubjective virtue. It was a kindred concept to ritual, "of the same cate"                                                                           ory
The "Good" 
    The quality that Sorai habitually associated with the benevolent rule that maximized 
profit to the realm was "good" (shan). His use of this word to describe profitable political 
actions, irrespective of the moral status of their authors, helps identify Sorai as a "political 
utilitarian." In effect, with his concept of "good" Sorai supplies the "crown[ing] definition" 
that a "Westerner [would] expect" for the structure of his utilitarian approach to government, 
found lacking by A. C. Graham in the utilitarianism of Mo tzu.94 
    In line with his overall purpose to shift attention from the moral state of mind of indi-
viduals to the consequences of their actions, Sorai criticized the use of the word "good" with 
reference to moral subjects and applied it to objective institutions. He rejected the Mencian 
theory that human nature was "basically good" (1,1/3/16/376). The Sung Neo-Confucians 
had taken "good" to refer to a naturally endowed goodness of disposition, a universally en-
dowed moral attribute of the subject, as opposed to the qualities acquired by learning. He 
quoted Chu Hsi's commentary to document this misunderstanding: "The good man is one 
whose disposition [endowed by birth] is beautiful but who has not yet studied." Nor had 
Jinsai been right to understand the good man in terms of personal moral conduct as "untiring 
in the practice of good" (XI,19/4/120/469).95 
    "Good
," rather, was predicated of the central instrumental values of Sorai's thinking and 
was characteristic of the government of Sages. It was associated with ritual and the institu-
tions created by the Former Kings. "With regard to ritual, there is nothing as good as the 
Way of the Former Kings in ordering the realm" (XV,32/4/247/600). However, crucially also,
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"
good" in this sense lay explicitly within reach even of those who were not Sages. Comment-
ing on Confucius' description of the good officer that "he preserves death as the good Way" 
(shan tao), which he identified as "an old saying," Sorai wrote: "There are things which even 
though not the Way of the Former Kings are good. Therefore this is called the `good Way" 
(VIII,13/3/344/666).96 "Good" thus linked the acts of Sages with those of men historically 
denied that status. It thus transcended history and could be said to bridge the absolute and 
the relative. 
    Confucius himself had spoken of the "good man" as next in status to the Sage; he la-
mented that he had seen neither.91 A "good man," according to Confucius' own definition, 
"does not tread in the footsteps of others, but, moreover, he does not enter into the chamber 
of the Sage."98 "Footsteps," Sorai explained, referred to the institutions set up by Sages.99 But 
because imperial authority has declined, the good man does not follow the "rites and music" 
of the Sagely founder of his dynasty (XI,19/4/120/470).100 Examples were Duke Huan of 
Ch'i and Duke Mu of Ch'in (VII,25/3/305/630). These were men traditionally classed among 
the "five hegemons" (pa). Mencius had condemned them as "transgressors against the three 
kings."10' They had "feigned" benevolence and used force. 102 Confucius had also discussed 
certain of these figures. But Sorai, typically, asserted that he had not criticized them from a 
moral point of view. Rather, Confucius' evaluation of Duke Wen of Chin as "crafty and not 
upright" referred not to his morality but to his military methods; it really meant "inventive 
in the use of unconventional soldiery and not using well-ordered flags and formations."103 He 
quoted Chao P'eng-fei104 to the effect that the derogatory classification "hegemon" had not 
existed in Confucius' time; it had been created during the later age of Mencius and Hsiin tzu 
(XIV,16/4/193/545-6). For Sorai, importantly, the pa bridged the gap between superordinate 
Sages on the one hand and rulers on the other who, though effective, were for historical rea-
sons denied the status of Sage or access to surviving Sagely institutions. 
    This point is developed in Sorai's discussion of another implicitly "good" man, Kuan 
Chung (d. 645 B.c.E.),l°s minister to Duke Huan of Chi. It was Kuan Chung, Sorai claimed, 
whom the disciple Tzu Chang had had in mind when asking Confucius about the "way of 
the good man." Sorai pointed out that, "though he did not follow the traces of a Sage, . . 
. [Kuan Chung] gave the appearance of having effectively entered the inner recesses of the 
Sage's [Way]" (XI,19/4/121/470). Strikingly, he used the same language of Kuan Chung's 
administration as he used for the actions of Sages. He wrote: "Suppose Kuan Chung had not 
met Duke Huan, then his achievement (kung) of saving the age and pacifying the people-
how could the realm in later ages have inherited it? This is why Kuan Chung should not be 
censured." Kuan Chung was responsible, in his capacity of adviser to Duke Huan, for the 
first pa, an achievement that Sorai viewed positively (XN,17-18/4/194-5/547). Once more, 
"
good" was linked to effective government and made to bridge the activities of Sages and their 
historically less favored successors.
The Problem of Regime Change 
    A further conspicuously utilitarian emphasis lay in Sorai's discussion of the difficult 
problem of dynastic change, or fang fa (expulsion and chastisement of a miscreant ruler) 
and k'ai-kuo (foundation of a new regime), and his assertion of the transcendent status of the 
"
princes who found regimes" (VI,28/3/270/596).106 Analysis of this problem focused on the
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transition from the Hsia to the Yin and from the Yin to the Chou dynasties. Chu Hsi had 
regarded the supplanting of the miscreant last rulers of Hsia and Yin as instances of moral 
"weighing" (ch'iian)107 and, potentially, as consistent with the Way. For Tokugawa Japanese 
Confucians, the question had been both salient and sensitive since the beginning of the 
regime,"' and was much debated. Clearly, the question of the legitimacy of the Tokugawa 
regime was implicit in these discussions. Many members of the influential Kimon school of 
Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682), for instance, held that the notion of royal dynastic change did 
not apply in Japan."' 
    Sorai rejected the Neo-Confucian moral view of regime change, as he did so much of 
Neo-Confucian moral thinking. He argued that dynastic change was a transcendent moment 
in history, inaccessible to the analysis or moral judgment of posterity. "Rulers who founded 
regimes are associated with Heaven." From Confucius and earlier, no one had discussed their 
actions; rather, they were the objects of honor and deference. Those who, from Warring 
States times, had belittled them were "transgressors against the Sages." Mencius had tried to 
out-argue such people, but instead had incautiously inaugurated a tradition of presumptu-
ous discussion of the subject (IX,29/4/40-1/403). In other words, the circumstances of the 
founding of a regime required the suspension of conventional human moral judgment. The 
foundation of new regimes could only be viewed in utilitarian terms: the only consideration 
was the implementation of the Way that the new regime made possible. 
    Sorai's robust, prima facie amoral and realist but essentially consequentialist and utilitar-
ian, view of regime founding is further illustrated by his discussion of Po I and Shu Ch'i, two 
heroes associated with opposition to the Chou conquest of Yin in ancient China. Their loy-
alty to the Yin was such that they had chosen to starve rather than serve in a court for which 
they were, by previous allegiance, morally disqualified and which they deemed illegitimate. 
Mencius had included Po among the Sages for his purity of mind."' Confucius had extolled 
the generosity of the two men towards the Chou, the cause of their misfortune: "Po I and 
Shu Ch'i did not keep the former wickednesses of men in mind, and hence the resentments 
directed towards them were few." These few "resentments," according to Chu Hsi's commen-
tary,"' were those of others towards them for failing to recognize the moral probity of the new 
regime, mitigated on account of their own exemplary moral purity. 
    Sorai's interpretation was radically different."' He rejected Mencius' classification of 
Po I as a Sage as imputing him to be "like Bodhidharma," that is rigorously and misguidedly 
ascetic. The "resentments" of Confucius' encomium were not those of others towards the 
heroes. Rather, the resentments were the heroes' own toward the ascendant Chou dynasty. 
They were aware that the Chou conquest had originated in aggression, but had simply and 
realistically come to the recognition that it was irreversible. They had therefore abated their 
resentments against Chou. Po I's seclusion, Sorai conceded, "looked like [continued] resent-
ment." Evidence that this was not the case was supplied by the fact that, as recorded in the 
Mencius, Po I had submitted to the Chou and "received the old age nourishment," so that 
his resentment was "cleanly absolved.""' What mattered to the two men, by implication, was 
not the possibly morally questionable pre-history of the founding of the Chou state. They 
were prepared to overlook that, rather, in the light of its consequences in facilitating the 
implementation of the Way. Once again, Sorai had provided a consequentialist and utilitarian 
explanation of an incident normally interpreted in terms of a deontological, inflexible loyalty 
(V,22/3/218-20/549-50). 114
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Elite Utilitarianism
    Sorai, it will have become clear, believed that "profit," the well-being of the community, 
was the proper object of the government not only of the Sages of antiquity but also of subse-
quent ages. How, then, did this objective relate to those who were, implicitly, its subjects and 
beneficiaries? Did Sorai's vision rest, as did J. S. Mill's, on the assumption that "an intelligent 
interest" "in the principle of the Greatest Happiness principle" should be "the inheritance of 
everyone born in a civilized country"?"' Was Sorai's utilitarianism a generalizable or universal 
philosophy of individual life, as Mill believed utilitarianism should be? Or was it, more per-
haps in the manner of Bentham, simply the guiding principle of government imposed by the 
legislator, a philosophy of political management?
    Sorai's unequivocal answer to this question defines his philosophy as "elite political 
utilitarianism." Sorai divided humanity into three groups: Sages, men of superordinate in-
sight, whose existence had been confined to Chinese antiquity, "superior men (chun-tzu)," 
whom he defined as "those who are [in positions of] superiority";116 and the "people" which 
included all others. His most radical division, however, was drawn between "superior men," 
who exercised political authority, and "the people," who were the objects of governance. This 
was a distinction of rank (wei) (IV, 11/3/176/509). True, Sorai conceded that "Those who are 
below but who have the virtue to be above are also called superior men"(IV, 16/3/183/515). 
Such a discrepancy between moral and political status had, however, implicitly not been 
characteristic of ancient times. 117 Moreover, Sorai believed that, in ancient China, the social 
and occupational order had been hereditary. Social mobility, or the desire for it, was a phe-
nomenon of decline.
In ancient times, kings enjoyed hereditary succession, as did feudal princes, the 
sons of ministers (shih-ta-fu) became ministers, and the sons of peasants, artisans 
and merchants became peasants, artisans and merchants, The division of honorable 
and base was fixed.... After the Ch'in and Han, men all began resentfully to crave 
to become the three dukes. (V,1/3/189-90/523).
Against this background, the "superior man" was concerned with "pacifying the people" 
(IV,11/3/176/509). His concern, whether he was the Son of Heaven, a feudal prince, minis-
ter or gentleman, was with this "Heavenly office" (T'ien-chih) (XVI,8/4/261/616). By con-
trast, the people-that is, peasants, artisans, and merchants-were identified as "the stupid 
of the lowest class" (hsia yii). "Since the stupid of the lowest class cannot change (i), they are 
regarded as the people (min) who do not ascend to gentlemen (shih)" (XVII,2/4/278/630). 
True, "men all have their respective virtues" (VI,17/3/253/580).18 But, as generically "small 
men," 119 the people had, in Sorai's view, a only a limited moral vision; being concerned with 
their own "warmth and satiety" (I, 14/3/49/403). Their outlook was "private" or "selfish," in 
contrast to the "public" concerns of the superior men (11,13/3/74/426). What they worked 
for was, precisely, profit, but "profit" in a morally limited and uninformed sense. Here, Sorai 
was able to draw on the negative view of "profit" that prevails through much of the Confucian 
canon. Theirs, in fact, was the "small profit," against which the Master himself had warned. "o 
Sorai, however, in a typically utilitarian concern with results rather than the moral status of 
agents, suggested that this morally inferior "profit" could be used instrumentally to persuade
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"small men" to act appropriately (IV,16/3/184/516). the people were thus the object of 
"transformation" (hua) through the institutional procedures imposed by "superior men," in 
order that they might "practice (hsi) and perfect their customs" (XV,24/4/242/594-5). On 
canonical authority, however, this was not a matter of imparting intellectual understanding. 
With the pedagogy of his contemporary Japanese Confucians in mind, Sorai condemned the 
"lectures" of "later Confucians" as ineffective (VIII,9/3/341/662-3). "Small men" were thus 
the passive, usually uncomprehending, objects of the administrative manipulations of the 
elite. 
    Elitism was, of course, built into the mainstream of the Confucian tradition. It was, 
however, generally mitigated by a tendency to universalism. To Sorai, however, the distinc-
tion between "superior men" and "small men" was particularly fundamental. In Benmei, in-
deed, he likened it to the difference between "the firmament and the earth." 121 Significantly, 
he seems uneasy with the positive expression of the golden rule; he could not accept that 
"small men" could understand the minds of "superior men." 122 Sorai's view of women, it may 
be added, seems dismissive even by Confucian standards. "Women serve others by means 
of [their physical] form; poor people do so by means of physical strength. In all cases, their 
aspiration does not lie towards the right" (XVII,25/4/312/660). 
    Sorai's elitism was recognized with repugnance by the people of his own age. Confu-
cians of the next generation, such as Goi Ranshu (1697-1762) and the Nakai brothers Chi-
kuzan (1730-1804) and Riken (1732-1817) are said to have criticized him precisely for his 
denial of moral subjectivity to "ordinary minds.""'
Beyond Rongo cho 
    Rongo cho is a commentary on a disjunctive and fragmentary text. Sorai's utilitarian-
ism is necessarily diffusely presented here. As he wrote this work, however, Sorai distilled his 
views in the more analytical and systematic form of his two treatises, Bendo and Benntei.124 
The overall structure of the Confucianism put forward in these works was, first, profoundly 
instrumental in a manner congruent with elite untilitarianism and a consequentialist view of 
morality. In a well-known passage in Benmei, Sorai defined the Way of the Former Kings as 
"entirely techniques (shu)".125 "Techniques", in turn, "refer to particular courses of conduct 
which, if men follow, they attain to naturally and unaware of so doing". They were, in effect 
a form of manipulation, the path that "`the people may be made to follow"'."' 
    In Benmei, he also focused more sharply on the concept of "profit" that, together with 
"good
," was the key concept in his utilitarianism. "Profit" was a property or "virtue" of the 
trigrams of the Changes. Like other such properties, "[no] invariable and compendious rule 
[could] be derived from [it]."127 It was, in other words, pragmatic and could be judged only 
by its consequences. He further classified "profit" into "several meanings": "material profit" 
(tsai-Ii chih 1i), 121 which he defined as "gains made in the pursuit of life"; "efficient profit" 
(jui-li chih li),129 or "ordering implements effectively and making them easy and convenient 
to use"; "opportune profit" (chi-li chih li), "doing something with success";130 and "beneficent 
and incremental profit" (li-i chih li), or "obtaining increase and bringing about the incurring 
of beneficence [to the realm].""' 
    In most canonical texts, Sorai argued, "profit" was spoken of from the point of view of 
the recipient or beneficiary. 112 Implicitly, this was the "small profit" disparaged in many Con-
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fucian texts. In the "Supplementary explanations" to the Changes, however, it was expounded 
from the standpoint of the "bestower," the superior man, for whom it was identified with 
the most important of all moral virtues exercised by those in authority: "`Profiting creatures' 
means bringing profit to the myriad creatures. This is benevolence."133 
    Sorai's clearest and most arresting articulation of his utilitarian beliefs is found in a key 
passage on "good" in Benmei. 
     "Good" is the opposite of bad. It is a broad term of reference. Its explanation ap-
     pears in the Mencius. There, it says: "The desirable is what is meant by the good."134 
     Even though it is not the Way of the Former Kings, in general what can profit men 
     and save the people is all referred to as "good." This is because it is what the many 
     men desire. The Way of the Former Kings is the perfection ofgood.... Those who, 
     even if they are not Sages, nonetheless can effectively, by establishing laws (fa), set-
     ting up institutions and thereby governing the state and pacifying the people, all 
     win the designation of "good people.""' 
    Here, "good" is defined clearly in consequentialist terms; it is what profits men and, in 
turn, satisfies men's desires."' It is explicitly linked to "profit." Moreover, once again, "good" 
is a value predicated alike of the government of Sages and their historically less privileged suc-
cessors. Most significantly of all, "good" here, as in Rongo cho is explicitly identified as tran-
scending the objective institutions of the Former Kings. It is also explicitly linked to "profit". 
This suggests that the principle of utility in some sense transcended faith in the Sages. Sorai's 
definition thus accords with Mill's famous definition of utilitarianism that "actions are right 
[in Sorai's terms "good"] in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence 
of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." 137 When this basic feature of 
Sorai's thought is set beside his indifference to the state of mind of the authors of actions 
and his political perspective, it can be seen that he is indeed properly described as a "political 
utilitarian."
Resonances with Classical Chinese Utilitarianism
    The claim that Sorai is a utilitarian thinker is by no means new. Already in the Tokuga-
wa period, Bito Jishu (1745-1813) had remarked of Sorai: "He is not a Confucian scholar. 
He is concerned with success and profit (kori). His fondness for the Sun tzu and authorship 
of a Japanese commentary on it reflect the direction of his basic ambitions." 13' That Sorai was 
a utilitarian thinker was claimed also in the Meiji period by the historian of Japanese Con-
fucianism, Inoue Tetsujiro (1855-1944), who suggested an affinity with Kuan tzu and the 
Legalist, Shang Yang. 139 Sorai, however, is remarkable for the range of influences suggested 
on his thought, particularly from ancient China. Identification of any particular intellectual 
debt on Sorai's part is rendered difficult by the sharing of what Schwartz called a "common 
discourse""' among ancient Chinese thinkers. Elements from different traditions of Chinese 
thought could combine and recombine without too conspicuous inconsistency. Imanaka sug-
gests that Sorai's use of "techniques" (shu), for instance, may be derived from the Legalist Han 
Fei tzu (d. 233 B.C.E.), on whose work he wrote a commentary. Following an observation by 
Kano Naoki (1868-1947), Imanaka also notes an affinity between Sorai and Yeh Shih, and,
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on the basis of indirect evidence, argues that Sorai was aware of and influenced by the Sung 
utilitarians. 141 
    The most frequently cited influence on Sorai is Hsun tzu, on whom he also wrote a 
commentary, and in whose thought, as already suggested, a utilitarian emphasis is often de-
tected."' Hsun tzu also shares with Sorai the belief that the Way is a human artifice, rather 
than natural. There appear to be two related questions here. The first is that of Hsun tzu's 
influence on Sorai; the second is whether that influence is towards utilitarianism. On the 
broader question, Imanaka claimed at least five features for which the formation of Sorai's 
thought was, whether directly or indirectly, indebted to Hsun tzu:143 the primacy of "ritual"; 
the concept of the "Way of the Former Kings" as man made and distinct from nature; the 
concept of Heaven as external to man; a tendency to a "Legalistic" view of administration; 
and his theory of human nature. 144 Most recently, Olivier Ansart's monograph on Sorai's 
political thought also devotes much attention to Hsun tzu's influence on Sorai. Ansart, while 
drawing attention to differences between them, writes that "Ogyu Sorai batit un systeme 
dont 1'architecture ne peut pas ne pas rappeler Xunzi [Hsun tzu]."145 For Ansart, "Sorai a 
developpe de maniere tres sophistiquee la philosophie ritualiste amorce par Xunzi."146 Much 
of this is persuasive, and even Maruyama conceded that "there is some truth" to the case that 
Sorai drew on Hsun tzu.147 
    But even if it is conceded that Sorai was indebted to Hsun tzu for the primacy of man-
made ritual in his thought, 148 this does not necessarily imply that Sorai's utilitarianism is 
derived from the same source. Schwartz's comments on the limits of Hsun tzu's utilitarianism 
have already been quoted; Hsun tzu was, in fact, interested in states of mind in a way for-
eign to utilitarianism. Maruyama himself correctly pointed out that Hsun tzu, unlike Sorai, 
believed that human nature could be changed by study 14' and that Sorai in fact condemned 
Hsun tzu's best-known teaching that human nature is evil, just as he did Mencius' teaching 
that it was good."' Moreover, Maruyama found Hsun tzu lacking in precisely the "modern 
consciousness germinating in Sorai's system"; his thought remained "continuous" between 
"public" and "private" and "ethics" and "politics.""' It may further be noted that Hsun tzu, 
unlike Sorai, identified a regenerated state of mind in Sagehood;152 was wary of "profit," 151 
identifying its pursuit as a hallmark of the evil nature of man;' 14 and was basically skepti-
cal about spirits and the supernatural, 115 where Sorai condemned atheism as presumptu-
ous (VI,20/3/256-7/583-4). Most strikingly, Hsun tzu, quite unlike Sorai,116 believed that 
the ruler should "not be secretive," but "open."157 Openness postulates a society based on a 
common morality accepted by individuals implicitly conceded some degree of moral inde-
pendence. Sorai, by contrast, maintained that moral understanding was confined to the elite 
and inaccessible to the general populace, who should be controlled through manipulations. 
Thus it seems unlikely that Sorai's political utilitarianism derives its basic assumptions from 
Hsiln tzu. 
    Recent work has also pursued Bito Jishu's early suggestion of influence from military 
thought, a ruthlessly "realist" and instrumental tradition. The work of Maeda Tsutomu (b. 
1956) has documented structural homologies between Sorai's thought and "military philoso-
phy." Maeda pointed to the similarity between Sorai's analysis, in his commentary on the Sun 
tzu, of the unknowability of the outcome of battle and his more general belief that Heaven 
was unknowable. Sorai's belief in politics as a means of manipulation that might be based
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on falsehood, Maeda also argued, resonated with the military need for secrecy and deception 
that is a feature of Sun tzu's (fourth century B.C.E.) military thinking. 118 It has also recently 
been suggested that Sorai's concern with the "unity" of society, to be achieved by "techniques" 
(shu), including, if necessary, "killing by warfare and executions" resonated with Sun tzu's for 
that of the army;"' and his vision of a society in which "all men are officers" might be influ-
enced "by the sense of the functional, rational and interdependent organization of an army 
that is a theme of such works of military philosophy as the Sun tzu."161 
    But Bito Jishu's use of the expression kori suggests another resonance with the utilitar-
ian tradition within Chinese philosophy. 161 The possibility of influence from this quarter 
has received less attention, particularly with regard to the ancient Chinese utilitarian, Mo 
tzu. The case for direct influence, here, as elsewhere, is in fact difficult to substantiate, partly 
again because of the common ground between the various ancient traditions. But Sorai was 
certainly familiar with the Mo tzu. In his Keishishi yoran, he described it as "essential reading," 
not least for its linguistic value. 162 The Rongo cho adduces philological evidence from this text 
(11,8/3/67/419). A systematic, statistical investigation of the linguistic or philological, influ-
ence on Sorai of Chinese utilitarian texts, both ancient and from the Sung utilitarians, has 
been beyond the scope of this essay. Some suggestions of linguistic influence, however, are 
quickly apparent. Ogawa Tamaki (1910-1993) notes that the expression sheng-wang, "Sage-
king," is used in a similar sense by Mo tzu and Sorai, though it is rarer and used differently 
in Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mencius.163 Sorai identifies "punishments and 
administration" (hsing-cheng), an expression used by Mo tzu, with the Way, though they 
had been condemned as a method of government by Confucius. 161 Such locutions as Mo 
tzu's "mutual (hsiang) love and mutual benefit" resonate with Sorai's "mutual cherishing and 
mutual love, mutual birth and mutual completion, mutual help and mutual nourishment, 
mutual correction and mutual succor"; 16' both men refer to "the will of Heaven" (T'ien-i) ; 166 
both employ the locution "people of Heaven" (T'ien-min).167 Most strikingly, both men use 
the locution "modeling on Heaven" (fa- T'ien) for Sagely administration. 168 
    Of course, Sorai cannot be claimed to be a Mohist in any open or declared sense. The 
attack of Mo tzu on the deleterious effects of Confucian "rites and music" made it difficult 
for Sorai explicitly to go much beyond recommending the text for its "dignified use of the 
ancient language." 16' Formally, Mo tzu remains for Sorai, as for other Confucians, among the 
representatives of heterodoxy (I, 11/3/42/398). None the less, even a preliminary survey will 
suggest striking structural and doctrinal commonalities. Even Mo tzu's well-known condem-
nation of Confucian ritual may matter less than first sight suggests; it is worth remarking that 
those aspects of Confucian ritual that Mo tzu most vehemently attacks, such as family and 
funeral rites, are those about which Sorai seems generally least insistent. 171 It is as though he 
tacitly acknowledges the force of Mo tzu's argument that they were dysfunctional. Both men, 
it is worth noting, were actively interested in military science, the most instrumental and 
goal-oriented of traditions available to them. But there are more positive similarities. Both 
stress that the Way is a large matter, not concerned with minutiae. 17' They share an explicit 
concern less with individuals than with the political order as a means to achieve a good soci-
ety. Within that large framework, Mo tzu speaks of three tests of "doctrine," summarized by 
A. C. Graham as "ancient authority, common observation, and practical consequences." 172 
    Just so, Sorai, too, constantly stressed the authority of the "FormerKings," the pervasive
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theme of his Rongo cho and other works of his later period. This authority derives, for both 
Mo tzu and Sorai, not from the Former Kings' exemplary character as human beings but 
from "their superior intelligence." 113 Like Mo tzu, Sorai particularly stressed the Odes and 
Documents as sources documenting this authority. 174 Both men stress the objectivity of the 
institutions created by the Former Kings and employ the analogy of carpentry for controlling 
the social order. Sorai's statement that "It is better to regard the way of the Former Kings as 
a compass and marking string. How can even a good carpenter, if he does not have compass 
and string, ascertain the straight and the crooked?" (11,19/3/83/433) 175 resonates with Mo 
tzu's use of the same analogy. 171 Medical analogies were used by both men, 177 and with par-
ticular fierceness by Sorai in his Seidan.178 Both men denied the "any notion of an immanent 
good in individuals or any latent good order of society." 17' Here again, Mo tzu demonstrates 
one of the discontinuities identified by Maruyama as "modern" in Sorai. 
    In broader discussions of government, Mo tzu and Sorai identify as the end of good 
administration a populace respectively "peaceful and without worry" (pien-ning wu yii)180 or 
"content" (an-wen). 181 Both believe in a social hierarchy and, strongly, or so they professed, 
in the need to promote men of ability."' Both men believe that the interventions of an au-
thoritarian government are the way to control and improve society. Mo tzu wrote: "When ... 
orders are not decisive (tuan), people will not stand in awe before them.""' Likewise, Sorai in-
sisted that "orders and regulations should not have to be explained" because that diluted their 
authority. 114 Both men take a positive view of "hegemons."185 Neither Mo tzu nor Sorai is 
interested in the moral or spiritual state of mind of the ruler. Schwartz writes: "Mo-tzu's righ-
teous man is totally oriented towards ` doing good' and not preoccupied with `being good.' 
[His] attention is totally and undeviatingly fixed on the world `out there.""" Here yet again, 
Mo tzu demonstrates one of the "modern" discontinuities that Maruyama identifies with 
Sorai. Mo tzu's "universal love" bears a strong resemblance to Sorai's "benevolence." Indeed, 
Sorai explicitly professed admiration for this doctrine. "When I formerly obtained and read 
the book of Mo tzu, I found that the doctrine of universal love that he puts forward was very 
different from [the version] that the Sung Confucians rejected. Thereupon for a long while I 
sighed with admiration." 117 Similarly, both proclaim the need for government both to know 
and reflect the "feelings" or "conditions" of those below (hsia chih ch'ing).188 Both men invest 
the "people" with a certain sanctity as "the "people of Heaven.""' At the same time, they 
shared a view of the common people as morally benighted."' Both denied the capacity of the 
common people subjectively to determine right action."' Only authoritarian intervention by 
an elite could prevent society from disintegrating. 
    But it is above all in the third of Mo tzu's "tests," that of utility, that the resemblances are 
most striking. The thought of both men is directed to the goal of "profit." Both Mo tzu and 
Sorai use the term "good" to evaluate actions that are "profitable" or "useful." Mo tzu identi-
fied the "good" with what profits Heaven, the spirits, and the people."' He asked: "How can 
there be anything that is good (shan) but not usable (k'o yung)?"193 Both relate benevolence 
to "profit for the realm.""' Both, however, insist that "profit" is constrained in practice by 
cc 
propriety.""' Moreover, just as Mo tzu's utilitarian ethic stands in a relationship of potential 
tension with his faith in the normative status of the Sages' actions, the same tension can be 
seen in Sorai's thought. As Sorai put it, "Even though it is not the Way of the Former Kings, 
in general what can at all profit men and save the people is all referred to as 'good.""" Both
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thinkers contrast with Hsun tzu in their strong emphasis on a religious belief that might 
seem to contradict their rational espousal of a utilitarian ethos. For both, the natural world, 
conceived to be ordered by "Heaven," is the raise-en-scene for human action; in framing their 
"institutions," rites and music, the Sages based them on the world as Heaven had ordained 
it to be. Both men, as already noted, use the locution "imitating Heaven" for Sagely admin-
istration.'' In Sorai's thought, "respect for Heaven" (ching T'ien; 1,1/3/19/378) and "respect 
for the spirits" (VI,20/3/256/583) represent both a basic recognition of the reality principle 
which constrains all human activity and an acknowledgment of the apparent irrationality of 
events in the world. For Mo tzu, Heaven and the spirits are to be "revered (tsun) and served".'9' 
This respect for Heaven and the supernatural rests uneasily with the belief, expressed by both 
thinkers, that men controlled their own destinies.'99 Something of the contradiction may 
recede, however, when it is recalled that both men seem to believe that aspects of religion 
represent what Sorai termed "techniques," for achieving the end of pacifying the people. Mo 
tzu advocated belief in "ghosts and spirits" out of what Schwartz calls "sociopolitical need."20° 
Sorai, similarly, believed that worship of the spirits was a man-made "technique of teaching," 
created by the "Former Kings" to establish and maintain order.20' 
    Many, if not most, of these elements common to Mo tzu and Sorai can, it need hardly 
be said, be found discretely in other pre-Chin thinkers, Confucius and Mencius included. 
They are part of the "common discourse" of ancient Chinese philosophy. Nor is there any 
reason at this stage of research to deny significant influence on Sorai from Hsun tzu, from 
the Chinese Legalists, from military thought, or, indeed, from the Sung utilitarians. Like his 
use of Lun yu commentaries, Sorai's more general thought is clearly eclectic.202 But the shared 
systematic structural coherence between the thought of Mo tzu and Sorai, the architecture of 
their systems, is arresting. The boldest interpretation would see this as the imprint of Mo tzu 
on Sorai. Such influence is entirely possible, since Sorai certainly knew that text and admired 
aspects of it. That he did not openly acknowledge such influence would not be surprising, 
given the formal status of Mo tzu as heterodox. A more cautious interpretation would see this 
as a parallel response. This is, again, not unlikely. For utilitarianism has a simple, coherent and 
rigorous rational structure. It has obvious attractions as a political doctrine to regimes under 
stress, seeking authoritarian solutions, or new modes of legitimation for political action. No 
doubt also it holds attractions to thinkers reacting against established or traditional modes of 
thought or religious systems.
Summing Up: Sorai's Utilitarianism-Elitist and Authoritarian 
    Sorai's Confucianism is marked by a vivid sense of history. His Analects commentary 
was a bold and original attempt to use historical and philological knowledge to retrieve Con-
fucius from what he perceived as the overlays of a distorting exegetical tradition. Rongo cho is 
a justly acclaimed monument to one man's erudition and historical imagination."' Like all 
Confucians, however, Sorai was also concerned with his own present. He implicitly required 
of Confucius that he be not only historically understood but also relevant to his own times. 
Yet his revisionist reduction of the Way to historical political institutions resulted in his own 
crisis of historicism. It exposed an apparent conflict between, on the one hand, a Way claimed 
to be transcendent and unchanging and, on the other, its historically conditioned expression.
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It has been argued here that, in addition to his declaration of faith in the Sages and in Heaven 
and his belief in philologically disciplined study, Sorai resolved this impasse through appeal to 
a set of values that related the absolute with the historical through the utilitarian concepts of 
"
profit" and "good." History and utility were thus intimately linked structural elements in So-
rai's thought. His utilitarianism filled in the space left by his historicization of the Confucian 
canon and of the person of Confucius himself. Though both historicism and utilitarianism 
had ancient roots in East Asia, Sorai's synthesis and exposition were new to Tokugawa Japan. 
He presented them with great erudition, intellectual authority and panache. He debunked 
Sung metaphysics and practice with energy and conviction. Sorai's Confucius, the student 
and perpetuator of an ancient tradition of political wisdom, is in many ways more compel-
ling than the morally perfect human being and teacher of metaphysics of the Neo-Confucian 
commentarial tradition. 
    Thus Sorai radically politicized the Confucian tradition. In place of the pursuit of indi-
vidual perfection, he argued that disciplined and objective historical knowledge, the goal of 
learning, equipped qualified individuals with the wisdom necessary to intervene politically 
in their own worlds. Such individuals based their actions generally on the utilitarian mea-
sures of the Former Kings as recorded in the Six Classics. Yet even faith in the former Kings 
was contingent upon utility. On the basis of their own knowledge of subsequent historical 
periods, students of the Way might supplement or even override the objective prescriptions 
of the Sages. As historical human agents, they thus possessed freedom from deontological 
moral constraints. Here, no doubt, is the modern "absolute agency" imputed by Najita to 
Maruyama's understanding of Sorai.204 And, as Maruyama proclaimed, Sorai thus dismantled 
the "medieval" structure of Sung metaphysics and cleared the way for new, independent dis-
ciplines. In retrospect, his thought indeed represents a way-station in the modernization of 
the Japanese intellectual world. 
    Yet at the same time, amid the celebration of Sorai's achievement, it is important not to 
lose sight of the less attractive features of his thought that relate to its utilitarian character. His 
interpretation of the Analects, despite its strengths, has been recognized to contain excesses.205 
His attempt to eliminate interiority and self-cultivation surely does violence to Confucian 
teaching, particularly in its Mencian version.206 His historicization of Confucius and the 
Confucian canon, despite signal and persuasive successes, ultimately resulted in a narrowing 
of access to the tradition and a restriction of its universalism. For Sorai, indeed, the study 
of history simply underlined the need for elite authoritarian interventions. But the requisite 
knowledge was restricted to a minority of "superior men." His sense of political realism sug-
gested that, where the vast majority of men was concerned, moral autonomy was an impracti-
cal and irritating distraction. Much of Sorai's polemical energy was directed precisely against 
the tradition within Confucianism that legitimated universal individual moral subjectivity. 
That tradition runs from Mencius through the Sung Neo-Confucians to Wang Yang-ming, 
precisely the thinkers criticized in Sorai's works. 
    Sorai's particular brand of political utilitarianism thus rested on a thoroughgoing elit-
ism, an aspect of his thought, as noted, condemned by later thinkers of his period. Indeed, 
Sorai adhered with special rigor to the Confucian distinction between "superior men" and 
"small men." The "superior men" were the only ones charged with governance and with for-
mulating and adjusting the institutional dispositions that constituted the Way. "Small men,"
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by contrast, were the passive, usually unknowing, objects of the administrative manipulations 
of the elite. Furthermore, at least as far as his own society was concerned, society was char-
acterized by a hereditary order of occupational status. Sorai's elitism was reinforced by the 
view that neither individual human natures nor the distribution of ability in society changed. 
"With regard to the fact that, among the people of the realm, the stupid and incompetent are 
many and the worthy and wise few, there is no difference between past and present."207 
    Utilitarianism, moreover, like the military thought to which it is in some respects kin, 
lends itself to an instrumental view of human life. Already, A. C. Graham noted a chilling 
quality in Mohist moral thinking: 
     [T]here is a tone of intellectual ruthlessness about the Mohists (with their utterly 
     dispassionate use of the word "love") which warns one againstsaying too easily that 
      they conceive men as Kantian "ends in themselves." Moral worth is independent of 
     external conditions, but nothing in the system forbids us to sacrifice an individual 
     for reasons external to himself.... [I] f a death and a life are equally beneficial there 
      is nothing to choose between them.208 
    Mutatis mutandis, this seems uncomfortably true also of Ogyu Sorai and his "benevo-
lence." There is a tendency for "pacifying the people" to feature more prominently than "what 
the many men desire." Sorai's knowledge of military thought and perhaps the Japanese mili-
tary culture that he identified with"' seemed to teach that human life was not sacrosanct.21° 
Najita asserts that "[t]he practical proposals that Sorai made for his society grew directly out 
of the . . . structure of his thought ."211 But Sorai's practical proposals frequently jar with the 
"benevolence" that Najita identifies in Sorai's theoretical writings. Indeed, there is a ruthless-
ness in the program of reform offered in Sorai's Seidan that reflects the spirit of his political 
utilitarianism. This is a repressive document. Sorai lamented the decline of summary execu-
tions by samurai of absconding servants, and was in favor of the sale of hereditary retain-
ers. Less dramatically, he wished to render the population immobile through institutional 
restrictions. In Taiheisaku, he made it clear that the objective of "pacifying the people" had 
little to do with Mencian or Neo-Confucian notions of compassion, which he described as 
the attitude of "women and nuns." It had more to do with the utilitarian's maximization of 
contentment or "pacification."
Again there are those who regard taking "no pleasure in killing men" as benevo-
lence.212 Truly to have a predilection for killing is not what the benevolent man 
does. Even so, rigidly not to kill men is not benevolence.... Pacifying the people 
is not like what is commonly called compassion. It is making the people content. 
That means making it so that the people can spend their whole lives without the ca-
lamities of famine, cold, and brigandage, with trust among neighborhoods, feeling 
it good to live in their state and their world, and taking pleasure in the occupation 
of their houses.213
    Maintaining this "contentment" might require such "techniques" as "killing by war-
fare and executions."214 Warfare was a discrete and legitimate "way." In his Rongo cho, Sorai 
seemed to reject the tendency to pacifism that had been an element of Confucianism since 
Mencius. He denied that Confucius himself was, as later Confucians had depicted him, un-
154 James MCMULLEN
studied in military matters (XV,,1/595-6/292-3). In Benmei, he was unapologetic about the 
use of force in government by those not Sages: "To use force when one's virtue is insufficient 
is unavoidable", he wrote of the hegemon (pa), "so why should it be accounted the offense of 
the person concerned?"215 Hostilities, once opened, required the suspension of benevolence. 
"If one truly dislikes unbenevolence, one should devise a way to take hold of the enemy 
without battle. But once one has already joined battle, one should not shun actions on the 
grounds that they are unbenevolent."216 In fact, Sorai, even in the context of the Analects, 
seems to have been drawn to the "truly beautiful virtue" of "firmness" or "hardness" (kang) 
(XVII,12/4/294/644), a "virtue" that he elsewhere identified as essential in soldiers.217 
    Sorai's ruthlessness may indeed owe to the ethos of samurai culture and to his own 
absorbing interest in military matters. But a degree of coercion, and even of violence, may be 
also seen as, to a greater or lesser degree, built into the form of elite managerial utilitarianism 
that Sorai espoused. Bernard Williams, a modern critic of utilitarianism argues: 
     If we insist on being told from what actual social spot the utilitarian judgments 
     are being made, and if we form some definite picture of utilitarian decision being 
     located in government, while the populace to a significant extent is non-utilitarian 
      in outlook,218 then it must surely be that government in that society is very impor-
      tantly manipulative.... This situation is inherently manipulative, and would very 
     probably demand institutions of coercion or severe political restriction to sustain 
      itself.219
    This paragraph assumes, from a modern liberal point of view, that democracy is the 
normative mode of government, that government is a response to popular demands. But 
its argument nonetheless holds true for non-democratic polities. In Sorai's ideal order, the 
rulers, elite bearers of the Way, are charged precisely to manipulate or coerce the populace 
by means of shu (techniques) of which the governed have no conscious understanding, let 
alone have consented to. That is why Sorai's philosophy is premised on the radical separation 
of the chiin-tzu from the hsiao jen. Consider, for instance Sorai's view of belief in the spirits. 
For him this is justified, not because it is true, but for its utility. It is a "teaching" set up by 
the "former kings" for utilitarian ends. In a remarkably similar direction, Williams points out 
that an intellectual elite of utilitarians in, for instance, a society where magic is accepted, "can 
view society and indeed have an effect on it, but they do not belong to it, and for the best 
outcome they let the local practices continue. It is not surprising that one should be reminded 
of colonial administrators, running a system of indirect rule."22° 
    All that is to say that, unsurprisingly, Sorai's thinking is authoritarian. After all, his 
thought has long been recognized as a reaction to a perceived crisis of warrior authority in his 
own society. In contemporary Edo, he saw only rampant urbanization, incompetent admin-
istration, and the powerlessness of the warrior elite with which he identified. Sung Neo-Con-
fucianism, which underwrote the notion of individual moral cultivation and responsibility, 
was patently inadequate to cope with this situation; it merely added to the cacophony. In this 
sense, that he opposed the enfranchisement as moral subjects of those beyond the political 
elite, Sorai is appropriately termed "reactionary". Is Sorai's elitist, authoritarian, and utilitar-
ian reformulation of Confucianism more illiberal than that of Confucius himself, Mencius,
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the Sung Neo-Confucian revivalists, or Wang Yang-ming? After all, Confucius himself, in an 
utterance that Sorai used to justify his own elitism, said that: "The people may be made to 
follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it" .221 But the answer must 
be yes, because the latter tradition at least imputed potential moral subjectivity to all men. 
Moreover, it can be argued to have tended to recognize men as ends in themselves, rather 
simply as than as subordinate, functional elements in a structure.222 As Watanabe Hiroshi (b. 
1946) has recently written of Sorai's thought: 
     Through the policies of a non-transparent ruler who has concealed his intentions 
     based on his own clear understanding of the people's modes of behavior, the people, 
      unbeknownst to themselves, acquire a minimal morality and pass happy lives. That 
      is a fiendishly clever concept of co-existence that is anti-freedom, anti-equality, and 
      thus thoroughly anti-democratic.223 
    Like certain thinkers in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe confronted with a 
similar burgeoning of economic and urban life, Sorai felt that "moralizing philosophy could 
no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men. New ways had to be 
found."224 Albert Hirschman (b. 1915) identified three approaches in the European response 
to this predicament: coercion, harnessing the passions, and playing some passions off against 
others.225 Of these, Sorai's solution suggests a synthesis of the former two. While he recog-
nized and sought to utilize a certain familial and communal instinct that he believed all men 
to possess, he also sought to restrain society's propensity for disorder by repressive and coer-
cive institutional controls. 
    Hiraishi Naoaki (b. 1945) has argued that Sorai's destruction of Sung Neo-Confucian 
belief that human moral and political institutions were a part of a rational moral-natural 
continuum and his recognition of irrationality in the world prepared the way for the in-
troduction of modern Western rationalism.226 The insight is powerful and persuasive. It is, 
moreover, enhanced by the very utilitarian approach to ideas and institutions inbuilt into 
Sorai's thinking. Others have hailed Sorai's view of the autonomous role of Sages as agents 
of moral and institutional creativity as incipiently modern. This essay has explored a differ-
ent aspect of Sorai. It has argued that his historicism created the need for a fresh criterion 
of political morality, and that that criterion was found in ethical consequentialism and the 
utilitarian concepts of "profit" and of "good." The essay also explored possible influences on 
the formation of Sorai's position. Utilitarian thought had an ancient provenance in East Asia. 
Even in its ancient form as found in the Mo tzu, it possessed an internally coherent logical 
structure that in certain respects was already "discontinuous" and "modern" in Maruyama's 
terms. Sorai's historicism, brilliantly realized in his Rongo cho, and the utilitarianism that 
complemented it were among the great creative intellectual and scholarly achievements of 
Japanese Confucianism. None the less, the roots of Japan's early intellectual modernization 
and the influences behind its formation in Sorai's thought may lie deeper in East Asian his-
tory than is ordinarily assumed. Moreover, Sorai's particular form of "elite political utilitari-
anism" was linked to a radically elitist and manipulative concept of the exercise of political 
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NOTES
1 I first suggested that there is a strongly utilitarian aspect to Sorai's thought in a review article (Mc-
Mullen 2001) of Tetsuo Najita's translation and introduction to Sorai's Bendo and Benmei, published 
as Tokugawa Political Writings (Najita 1998). The present article is mainly based on a reading of Sorai's 
most formal works, his Rongo cho, Bendo, and Benmei, together with his more practical, Japanese-lan-
guage writings, Taiheisaku, Tomonsho, and Seidan. I am grateful to members of the Maui conference for 
their comments on the first draft of this essay, and to Kate Nakai (Sophia University), my brother David 
McMullen (University of Cambridge), and Wim Boot (University of Leiden) for reading later drafts 
and suggesting valuable corrections and improvements. I must express particular gratitude to Professor 
Matsuzawa Hiroaki, Professor Emeritus of the University of Hokkaido and in 2003 TEPCo Visiting 
Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, for the care and attention with which he read one of the later 
drafts of this paper, corrected mistakes, and offered further valuable advice for its improvement 
2 Ogyu Sorai, Sorai Sensei tmonsho (hereafter, Tomonsho. Citations to this text are to the facsimile 
text page number followed by a slash ("/") and page reference to the transcription), pp. 382/432-33; 
Yamashita 1994, p. 45; the translation here is adapted slightly. 
3 Tomonsho, pp. 382/432; Yamashita 1994, p. 44; Sorai misattributed the metaphor to the Hsiin tzu. 
4 See Lidin 1973, p. 51. The Chin shu, Sung shu, Nan-Ch'i shu, Liang shu, and Ch'en shu are men-
tioned. 
5 Tomonsho, p. 418/485; Yamashita 1994, p. 114. 
6 Cf. Mencius VB, 8 (ii); James Legge's translation, CC II, p. 392. 
7 Ogyu Sorai, Gakusoku, p. 257/193; Minear 1976, p. 23. In references to Sorai's Chinese-language 
works in OSZ[M], OSZ[K], and NST, the original Chinese version is cited first by page number, fol-
lowed by a slash ("/") and the page reference to the kakikudashi. 
8 For a survey of important recent scholarship on Sorai, see Tucker 2006, Ch. 3, "Sorai in Modern 
Intellectual History." 
9 Maruyama 1974, p. 99. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., pp. 183-4. Maruyama's interpretation has been developed further, albeit with a dissenting 
opinion on Sorai's "modernity," in the recent monograph of Olivier Ansart, (Ansart, 1998). For Ansart's 
Sorai, history is the operation of nature that, itself "meaningless," provides the context in which the 
Sages created political and moral order through the artifice of "ritual." History, whose instability in 
Sorai's view Ansart documents by quotation (pp. 86-91; 190-91), is thus a facet of nature and is not 
in itself a primary focus of Ansart's analysis. Sorai's history is characterized by Ansart as "un renouvel-
lement constant et sans pitie." Otherwise, however, Ansart does not single out this topic for special 
attention. His main interest in his stimulating monograph is, rather, on the constructed character of 
"ritual" and its separation from nature. "Le plus grand interet de la reflexion soraienne ne reside pas dans 
les thematiques de la nature et de I'artifice, mais it en decoule. Le plus grand interet de cette pensee, 
c'est d'offrir une nouvelle intuition du rite" (p. 233). Ansart also extends his enquiry into language and 
literature in the eighteenth century. Much of his work explores resonances between Sorai's thought and 
Western political and moral philosophy. 
12 Najita 1998, p. Iii. 
13 Ibid., p. x. 
14 "Historicism" is here defined as "the tendency to interpret the whole of reality, including what ... 
had been conceived as absolute and unchanging human values, in historical, that is to say relative, terms."
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(Ibid., italics in the original.) White 1976, p. xvii. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For a canonical expression of awareness of historical change, see e.g. Analects XV, 10; CC I, pp. 297-
98: The Master said, "Follow the seasons of Hsia. Ride in the carriage of Yin. Wear the ceremonial cap 
of Chou. Let the music be the Shao and its pantomimes." 
17 Tomonsho, p. 382/432; Yamashita 1994, p. 44. 
18 Benmei, pp. 211/44-45; Tucker 2006, p. 176. See also ibid., pp. 216-17/63; Tucker 2006, pp. 197-
98. 
19 White 1976, p. xvii. 
20 For the communal reflexes natural to humans, see e.g. Benmei, p. 213/54; for filial piety as a natural 
virtue, ibid., pp. 223/84-85. 
2 1 Sorai also wrote in Tomonsho: "The Sages teachings have no past and no present, nor does the Way. If 
one used the Way of the Sages, even the provinces and the realm as they exist today would be ordered." 
See Tomonsho, p. 409/472; Yamashita 1994, p. 96; also Gakusoku, 257/193; Minear 1976, p. 23. 
22 Benmei, pp. 250-1/170; Tucker 2006, p. 319. 
23 Tomonsho, p. 396/452; Yamashita 1994, p. 71. Compare Benmei, p. 169/260; Tucker 2006, p. 
319. 
24 Benmei, pp. 235/120; Tucker 2006, p. 263. Compare Benmei, p. 238/130; Tucker 2006, p. 273. 
25 Benmei, p. 238/130; Tucker 2006, p. 273. P'ei carries the particular nuance of `association as an 
object of worship'. 
26 Benmei, pp. 236/122-23; Tucker 2006, p. 266. 
27 Maruyama 1974, pp. 27-28. 
28 This problem is also raised by Ansart 1998, pp. 86-91. 
29 Tahara 1991, p. 4; attributing this view to early Maruyama, Bito Masahide, Uete Michiari (b. 
1931); and Hiraishi Naoaki. 
30 Ibid., p. 16. 
31 Benmei, p. 222/80; referring to To chuan, Duke Hsi year 27; CC V, pp. 200-01; Tucker 2006, p. 
216. 
32 Benmei, p. 220/75; Tucker 2006, p. 211. Sorai's objective interpretation of i warrants translation 
of his usage of this word as "propriety." For Sorai, "proprieties" were "sub-divisions of the Way," the 
appropriate conduct in particular situations. These "thousand distinctions and ten thousand divisions" 
were systematized into permanent rituals by the Former Kings (Ibid.). Elsewhere in this essay, the more 
conventional translation of i as "righteousness" or "right" has been followed. 
33 Taiheisaku, p. 473. The authenticity of this text has been questioned, notably by Bito Masahide 
(" Taiheisaku no chosha ni tsuite," Nagoya Daigaku Nihonshi ronshu, gekan, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 
1975). However, Maruyama Masao (Maruyama 1973) and Hiraishi Naoaki (Hiraishi 1984, pp. 229-
39) have advanced persuasive circumstantial arguments together with arguments from content in favor 
of Sorai's authorship. Hiraishi dates the writing of this work to "the turn of the eighth to the ninth 
month of Kyoho 6 [1721]." (p. 236). 
34 Imanaka 1975, p. 646. 
35 Seidan, p. 305; Lidin 1999, p. 138. 
36 Benmei, p. 233/114; Tucker 2006, p. 257. 
37 Benmei, p. 218/68; Tucker 2006, p. 203. 
38 Benmei, 218/68; Tucker 2006, p. 203. Compare Moshi shiki p. 667/478: "Alas! How can the minds 
of the Sages be glimpsed and measured?" 
39 References to Rongo cho are to the original Chinese text of the Lun yu in the numbering of James 
Legge in CC I [in bold], the facsimile reproduction of the 1740 woodblock Chinese text of Sorai's com-
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mentary, and the kakikudashi text in the Misuzu Shobo edition (OSZ[M], vols 3-4). They are given in 
the following form: (Analects ref. / OSZ[M] volume number / facsimile text page number / kakikudashi 
text page number). I have also consulted the kakikudashi of the Kawade Shobo edition (OSZ[K], vol. 
2). Sorai's commentary is discursive in style. In citing his views, I have usually, for the sake of economy 
in presentation, omitted the original Analects passage on which Sorai commented except in those cases 
where the context makes citation necessary or helpful towards understanding Sorai's meaning. 
40 Benmei, p. 217/64; Tucker 2006, p. 198. 
41 The case that the mind of the Sages is accessible to others is argued in Tahara 1991, p.44. 
42 For the process of regeneration, compare Tomonsho, p. 408/470 and Yamashita 1994, p. 93, together 
with the translator's footnote no. 107, where Yamashita glosses the verbs used by Sorai for societal and 
individual change. Thus i fl; is often used for changes in individuals "brought about through self-
cultivation," while hua I L signified "changes imposed by others," for instance by government on the 
governed. 
43 Benmei, pp. 250-1/170; Tucker 2006, p. 319. The pedagogy is also outlined in Benmei, p. 249/164; 
Tucker 2006, p. 313, where the endstate is explicitly "to reach to the minds of the Former Kings." 
44 Taiheisaku, pp. 449-50. 
45 Nakai 2002, pp. 274-75. 
46 Sorai's concept of the kuruwa (enceinte) that confines each mind in its historical environment hints, 
at least metaphorically, at an awareness of the problem. See Taiheisaku, p. 449. 
47 Smart and Williams 1973, p. 47. 
48 Honderich 1995, p. 890; J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism," in Ryan 1987, pp. 289-90. 
49 Honderich 1995, p. 890. 
50 Ryan 1987, p. 58. 
51 Analects, XIV, 13 (ii); CC I, pp. 279-80. 
52 Analects IV, 16; CC I, p. 170. For Sorai's different reading, see IV,16/ 3/183-85/515-16: "As for the 
Way of teaching men, to superior men one does so by propriety; to small men, by profit." 
53 Mencius, IA 3; CC II, p. 126. 
54 For an instructive analysis of the social basis underlying the Neo-Confucian rejection of "utility" 
see Watanabe 1997, pp. 76-89. Watanabe sees the Neo-Confucian condemnation, of "profit" and utility 
as inspired by the need for an ethos that legitimated the existence and moral status of the shih-ta fu as 
a governing elite. 
55 Chan 1967, p. 57. 
56 Chan 1963, p. 123. 
57 Changes, "Ch'ien," Wen yen; Sung 1935, pp. 5-6 (adapted). Cf. ibid, "Great Appendix" II, 1; Sung 
1935, p. 308: "How shall [the Sage] collect a large population around him? By the power of his wealth. 
The right administration of that wealth, correct instructions to the people, and prohibitions against 
wrong-doing; - these constitute his righteousness." 
58 Mencius, VIIB, 25 (ii); CC II, p. 490. For comment on this passage, see Graham 1978. Graham's 
translation is adopted here. 
59 For Hsiin tzu as a utilitarian, see Fung 1952, vol. 1, p. 298. 
60 Schwartz 1985, p. 299. 
61 Ibid., p. 300. 
62 Graham 1978, p. 4. 
63 Lo 1974, p. 156. 
64 Ibid., p. 161. 
65 Imanaka 1966, pp. 398-99. 
66 Tillman 1994, pp. 1-2.
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67 Ogyu Sorai, "Letter in reply to Yabu Shin'an," quoted in Iwahashi 1969, pp. 180-8 1. 
68 Iwahashi 1969, p. 180. 
69 The following have been particularly helpful in approaching this difficult text: Yamashita 1977-79, 
Hiraishi 1995, Ogawa 1994. 
70 Sorai's choice of interpretation and the motives behind it are incisively analyzed in Hiraishi 1995. 
71 Commenting on V, 23 (CC I, p. 181); Sorai explained that Confucius was teasing Wei-sheng Kao. 
"This is the height of friendliness" (V, 23/3/220/551). 
72 Sorai distrusted generalizations about the Way; his reflexes were those of a nominalist: "The way 
should not be made the subject of generalizing arguments" (XVIII, 8/4/322/671). Generalizations 
might lead to hypostatization of the Way, which, in turn, might suggest a substantial, underlying reality 
and a goal of salvation or mystical interest. 
73 Watson 1968, p. 364. 
74 Mencius IA, 7 (viii); CC II, p. 141. 
75 Benmei, pp. 216/ 63; Tucker 2006, p. 197. 
76 Book of Documents, "The counsels of the Great Yii," CC III, p. 56; [Legge translates as "the conve-
niences of life and the securing abundant means of sustentation"]. 
77 Cf. also Analects XVI, 2; CC I, 310. 
78 Further, commenting on Analects IX, 3 (i), "The Master said, `The linen cap is that prescribed by 
the rules of ceremony, but now a silk one is worn. It is economical, and I follow the common practice."' 
Sorai commented "I take Confucius' following the common practice as profoundly grasping ritual and 
not diverging from the mind of the former kings" (IX,3/4/10/373). 
79 For this incident, see Noguchi 1993, pp. 240-44. 
80 See Mencius IIA, 2 (xxiii; xxviii); CC II, pp. 194; 196. 
81 Cf Hiraishi 1995, p. 233. 
82 Ito Jinsai, Dojimon, quoted in Hiraishi 1995, p. 225. 
83 Cf Analects XIII, 17; CC I, p. 270: "Looking at small profit prevents great affairs from being ac-
complished." 
84 The Book of Documents, "The Counsels of the Great Yd"; CC III, p. 56. 
85 Changes, CC h'ien," Wen yen; Sung 1935, p. 11. 
86 Great Learning, X, 23; CC I, p. 381 (adapted). 
87 The term kung-li is not confined to Mo tzu. But Sorai himself associated it with the ancient utilitar-
ians. See Moshi shiki, p. 662/466: "The schools of Kuan [Chung] and Shang [Yang] attach chief impor-
tance to punishments, names, success, and profit. They are simply close to Mo Ti." 
88 Mencius, VILA, 32; CC II, p. 468. Mencius was apparently inconsistent on the subject of wealth. He 
had quoted the saying of Yang Hu that "He who seeks to be rich will not be benevolent. He who wishes 
to be benevolent will not be rich" (Mencius, IIIA, 3 (v); CC II, p. 240), but, Sorai argued, "These were 
the words of a small man," quoted by Mencius out of disputatiousness (IV,5/3/166/500). 
89 Changes, "Ch'ien," Wen yen; Sung 1935, p. 6: "The superior man, embodying benevolence, is fit 
to preside over man." 
90 Analects, IV, 13; CC I, p. 169. 
91 Sorai here quoted The Book of Documents, "The Announcement of Chung Hui"; CC III, p. 182: 
"Order your affairs b
y propriety; order your heart by ritual" (adapted). 
92 For the modern critic Noguchi Takehiko (b. 1937), "profit" is the "basic concept of Soraigaku"; 
Noguchi 1993, p. 37. 
93 At first sight there would seem to be a contradiction between this claim and the general condemna-
tion of "profit" in the Analects, let alone Sorai's own comment on "The Master said: ` He who acts with 
a constant view to his own profit will be much murmured against"' (CC I, 169 [adapted]: "Profit is not
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what the superior man honours" (IV 12131176/509). Sorai would have explained the contradiction with 
reference to Confucius' own contrast between the "small profit," which looked for quick results. This 
was characteristic of the mind of the "small man." Its implied opposite was the "great [matters]" and 
the "great intellect and farsightedness" of the Sage (XIII,17/4/172/522). He also suggested in Benmei 
that in most canonical texts, "profit" was spoken of from the point of view of the recipient). But in 
the Changes, it was expounded from the standpoint of the "bestower," implicitly the man in political 
authority, for whom it was identified with the most important of all moral virtues exercised by those 
in authority: "`Profiting creatures' means bringing profit to the myriad creatures. This is benevolence." 
(Benmei, p. 234/118). See below. 
94 Graham 1978, pp. 50-51. 
95 In a similar direction, Sorai argued that Chu Hsi had been wrong to understand Confucius' criti-
cism of the music of Wu as "not perfectly good" as based on moral failings in Wu; the word was sim-
ply an aesthetic judgment on the music itself (111,25/3/156/492). But the word could be applied to 
"benevolence," the virtue that drove "pacifying the people": it was "the topmost among the many good 
[virtues]" (IV,3/3/165/500). Perhaps Sorai's preferred sense was "competent" or "effective," closest to 
the English "good at," a locution that carries a suitably end-oriented nuance. "Music is better (shan) 
than anything at changing `manners' (XVII,4/4/281 /632; quoting Classic of filial piety). 
96 Following the kakikudashi of OSZ[K], vol 2, p. 172. 
97 VII, 25; CC I, p. 203. 
98 XI, 19; CC 1, p. 244. 
99 He quoted The Book of Documents, "The successful completion of the war," II; CC III, p. 311: 
"It was King T'ai who laid the foundations (`footsteps') of the imperial inheritance" (yet he was not a 
Sage). 
100 He quoted Mencius IVB 21 (i); CC II, p. 327: "Mencius said, ` The traces ("footsteps") of sovereign 
rule were extinguished, and the royal odes ceased to be made. When those odes ceased to be made, then 
the Ch'un Ch'iu was produced. 
101 Mencius, VIB, 7 (i); CC II, p. 435. Their government is described at ibid., (iii); CC II, p. 437. 
102 Mencius, IIA, 1; CC II, p. 196. 
103 Cf. Sun tzu, Sawyer 1993, p. 170. 
104 A Sung-era commentator on classical texts from the Spring and Autumn period.. 
105 Both criticized and praised by Confucius. See Analects III, 22; CC I, 162-63: "The Master said: 
`Small indeed was the capacity of Kuan Chung.... If Kuan knows the rules of propriety, who does not 
know them?"' See also Analects XIV, 17-18; CC I, pp. 281-82: "Tzu-lu said, ` The duke Huan caused 
his brother Chiu to be killed, when Shao Hu died with his master, but Kuan Chung did not die. May 
not I say that he was wanting in benevolence?' The Master said, ` The duke Huan assembled all the 
princes together, and that not with weapons of war and chariots:- it was all through the influence of 
Kuan Chung. Whose benevolence was like his? Whose benevolence was like his?' Tzu-kung said, ` Kuan 
Chung, I apprehend, was wanting in benevolence. When the duke Huan caused his brother to be killed, 
Kuan Chung was not able to die with him. Moreover, he became prime minister to Huan.' The Master 
said, ` Kuan Chung acted as prime minister to the duke Huan, made him leader of all the princes, and 
united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present day, the people enjoy the gifts which he 
conferred. But for Kuan Chung, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our 
coats button on the left side."' 
106 "Rulers who found regimes, like Yao, Shun, Yd, Tang, Wen, and Wu, are regarded as Sages. 
Successor ulers and ministers, even should they have perfect virtue, cannot be acclaimed as Sages" 
(VI,2812701596). 
107 Chu tzu yu-lei, ch. 37; vol. 1, p. 1578. "Weighing" was, potentially at least, an activity accessible to
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all students of the Way. For Sorai's explicit rejection of Chu's explanation, see Benmei pp. 253/178-79; 
Tucker 2006, pp. 329-30. 
108 For Hayashi Razan's discussion of this problem with Tokugawa Ieyasu, see Hori 1964, pp. 159-
64. 
109 See e.g. Asami Keisai, Chugoku ben, p. 416. 
110 Mencius VB, 1 (v); CC II, p. 371. 
111 Quoted by Sorai here at ` ,22/3/218/549. 
112 Yamashita Ryuji (Yamashita 1977-79, Part III, pp. 502-496) points to the influence on Sorai of the 
Ming scholar Wang Chih (1379-1462) and his essay "I Chi shih pien." 
113 Cf. Mencius, IVA, 13; CC 11, pp. 303-04. Sorai here also rejected the story that Po I and Shu Ch'i 
had "restrained the horse" of King Wu in order to remonstrate with him for hastening a campaign 
against King Chou before burying his father. This matter had been "exhaustively refuted" by Wang 
Chih of Ming. 
114 A further emphasis in the same direction can be seen in Sorai's interpretation of Confucius' appro-
bation of his disciple Tzu Kung, who was normally disparaged because he "became rich" (Analects, I,15; 
Legge's commentary; CC I, 144). Sorai, typically, defended Tzu Kung and claimed that the advice was 
not concerned with personal moral cultivation but with transforming the people (1,15/3/50-4/404-6). 
See Yamashita 1977-79, Part II, pp. 41-42. 
115 Mill 1987, p. 285. 
116 Benmei, p. 254/181; Tucker 2006, p. 333. 
117 Sorai pointed out in Benmei that ideally this situation did not occur, because: "The men of old, 
when they studies and achieved virtue, were promoted to gentlemen and thereby became officials" 
(Benmei, p. 254/18 1; Tucker 2006, p. 333). 
118 Cf. Doctrine of the Mean, XII, 2; CC I, pp. 391-92. 
119 Benmei, p. 254/182; Tucker 2006, p. 334. 
120 For Confucius' strictures against profit, see Analects IV, 12; 16; XIII, 17; CC I, p. 270: "Do not 
look at small profit." Sorai believed that Mencius, in his famous first royal audience with King Hui of 
Liang, had overdrawn the distinction between "righteousness" [sc. "propriety"] and "profit" for factional 
purposes, untrue to Confucius' teachings. He had wished to refute the prevalent utilitarian (kung-li) 
schools of his day (IX,1/4/5/368-69). 
121 Benmei, p. 240/138; Tucker 2006, p. 283. 
122 Sorai's views on this topic require further study. The negative formulation of the golden rule ap-
pears three times in the Analects. The first instance (v,11/3/202-4/535-36) Sorai interpreted in the 
sense of "what I don't want a man to do to me, I don't want him to do to others either," i.e. as a general 
discouragement against wronging others, rather than a version of the golden rule itself; for helpful com-
mentary on this passage, see NST 36, p. 569). Sorai passed over the second case (XII,2/4/132/482) 
with a simple gloss "reciprocity." The third instance (XV,23/4/241/593-94) he dismissed as an inter-
polation. See also McMullen (2001), note 16 (p. 261). In Benmei (pp. 225/90-91; Tucker 2006, p. 
227-29), Sorai discussed the golden rule under the rubric of "reciprocity." He seems unhappy with a 
positive application of the rule as "not within the capability of the student." This was because "men's 
hearts are not the same; what they desire may be different" (cf. Tso chuan, Duke Hsiang 31; CC V, pp. 
552, 566). Nor was he altogether happy with the Sung Neo-Confucian explanation of "inferring from 
oneself," perhaps precisely because it suggested a basic equality among men. "Generally speaking, when 
one explicates it as inferring from oneself, one might arrive at [the impossibility of] searching out the 
mind of the superior man through the belly of the small man" (cf. Tso chuan, Duke Shao 23; CC V, 
pp. 726-28). Sorai's difficulty with the golden rule contrasts with the endorsement of J. S. Mill, who 
believed that the golden rule was "the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." This was because Mill,
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in contrast to Sorai, believed that utilitarianism should be a generalizable philosophy of individual life; 
"education ...should establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his 
own happiness and the good of the whole" (Mill 1987, pp. 288-89). 
123 See for example Najita 1987, pp. 132, 133, 161-63. 
124 For dating of Rongo cho and Benmei to around 1720, see Hiraishi 1984, p. 125; Bendo is slightly 
earlier, in 1717 (ibid., p. 107). 
125 This concept was usually regarded with suspicion by Confucians, but Sorai attempted to rehabili-
tate it through reference to Hsm tzu, II, p. 425. 
126 Benmei, p. 211/47; Tucker 2006, p.179; the last sentence is quoted from Analects, VIII, 9: CCI, 
p. 211. 
127 "Great Appendix," II, 8; Sung 1935, p. 328; Benmei, p. 233/115; Tucker 2006, p. 258. 
128 Analects, IV, 16; CC I, p. 170 [Legge, "gain"]; Analects IV, 12; CC I, p. 169 [Legge, "advantage"]; 
Analects, XIV, 13 (ii); CC I, p. 279-80 [Legge, "gain"]. 
129 Book of Documents, "`The counsels of the Great Yd," CC III, p. 56 [Legge, "the conveniences of life 
and the securing abundant means of sustentation"]; Analects, XV, 9; CC I, p. 297 [Legge, "sharpen"]; 
Tso chuan, Duke Shao 17, CC V, pp. 666-67 [Legge, "They saw to the provision (li) of implements and 
utensils (ch'i yung)]. 
130 Changes,"Fu": There will be advantage in whatever direction movement is made"; Sung 1935, p. 
107; ibid., "Hsii": "It will be advantageous to cross the great stream"; Sung 1935, p. 31. 
131 Changes, "Ch'ien," Wen yen; Sung 1935, pp. 5-6; "what is called the advantageous"; Changes, 
"Great Appendix," II; Sung 1935, p. 311 [Legge, "All under Heaven were benefited"]. 
132 Hence, perhaps, the rather disparaging, cautious, or negative view of it. 
133 Benmei, pp. 234/117-8; Tucker 2006, pp. 260-61. 
134 Mencius, VIIB, 25; CC II, p. 490; cf. Graham 1978, p. 51. 
135 Benmei, p. 232/113; Tucker 2006, p. 256. Sorai seems to have in mind here the distinction be-
tween Sages or Kings and hegemons. He analysed the relationship between "king" and "hegemon" in 
the final passage of Benmei (pp. 254-55/182-5; Tucker, pp. 334-37). Here, too, though he did not use 
the word "good," he attempted to establish the pa as legitimate exercisers of power, whose government 
was linked historically to that of the Sages. He reasserted that the distinction between king and hege-
mon had not been made in Confucius' time. Confucius did not criticize the pa. In fact, the difference 
lay only in "time" and "situation." Confucius himself, had he been employed, would have copied Kuan 
Chung, minister to duke Huan of Ch'i. Mencius had made the distinction and had imputed the use of 
force rather than virtue, to the pa. But, Sorai argued, the pa had only used force when issuing orders 
to fellow rulers, not with respect to the internal administration of their people. Furthermore "To use 
force when one's virtue is insufficient is unavoidable, so why should it be accounted the offense of the 
person concerned?" (pp. 255/183-4; Tucker 2006, p. 335). Later in the same passage, Sorai perhaps 
backtracked a little, no doubt partly to accommodate Confucius' disparagement of Kuan Chung. 
     Although [the pa] used administration (cheng) and punishments (hsing), they were not comparable 
     with [the Legalists] Shen [Pu-hai], Han [Fei], or Shang Yang. The difference from the Former Kings 
     lay simply in that their impetuous will to success and profit (kung-li) predominated, and they did not 
     employ rites and music. This is the only sense in which Confucius held that Kuan Chung's capacity 
     was "small" (Analects III, 22; CC I, pp. 162-63; Benmei, p. 255/184; Tucker 2006, p. 336). 
Implicit here is the concept of "success and profit" as acceptable aims of administration; it seems that 
Sorai criticized the pa only for adopting "impetuous" methods, rather than for their aims. Similarly, 
Sorai, in fact, included "punishments and administration" (hsing-cheng) within the Way (Bendo, p. 
201/13; Tucker 2006, p. 140). The expression "administration and punishments," it is suggested in 
an NST supplementary note (p. 549), is a borrowing from the "Record of music" book of the Book of
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Rites, where they are attributed to the "ancient kings" (Legge tr., Li chi: Book of rites vol. 2, p. 97). It 
should also be noted that the expression is also found as here in the form hsing-cheng in the Mo tzu (I, 
149; Mei 1929, p. 30). 
    Sorai endorsed "administration and punishments" despite the fact that Confucius had spoken 
negatively of them as a technique of government since they encourage mere avoidance (Analects II, 
3; CC I, p. 146). But Sorai commented that this passage really meant exclusive or "hasty" use of this 
technique, like the pa's hasty pursuit of profit, was wrong; "administration and punishments" were 
legitimate, but should be complemented by "virtue." "Avoid," Sorai seems to suggest, did not mean 
simply "be evasive"; the method of "giving uniformity" was indeed "eff"ective in making the people avoid 
punishment and disgrace" (II/3/3/497/35). 
136 It is an irony that Sorai borrows his definition from Mencius, possibly the least utilitarian of ancient 
Confucian thinkers. See above. 
137 Mill 1978, p. 278. 
138 Seigaku shisho, quoted in Maeda 1996, p. 228. Bito Jishu was not impartial; he was associated with 
the 1790 Kansei prohibition of heterodoxy. For the sectarian background and content of Seigaku shisho, 
see Backus 1979, pp. 78-80. 
139 Inoue 1945, p. 570. The utilitarian cast of Sorai's thought was also remarked upon by Yamaji Aizan 
(1864-1917); see Noguchi 1993, pp. 19-20. 
140 Schwartz 1985, p. 174. 
141 Imanaka 1966, pp. 147-50, 406-7. Imanaka's argument is that evidence that Sorai knew of Yeh 
Shih is provided from a mention of him in the context of his discussion of Ito Jinsai's views on literature 
in his Ken'en zuihitsu (p. 147). Further, Yeh Shih wrote a preface to the Lung-chuan wen chi of Ch'en Li-
ang (described by Imanaka as the founder of the "even more utilitarian Yung K'ang School"), the other 
major Sung utilitarian. This preface was included in the Shui-hsin chi of Yeh Shih, which Sorai criticized 
in his Ken'en zuihitsu. Thus, "it was not the case that Sorai was ignorant of him" (p. 149). Imanaka notes 
shared views between the Sung utilitarians and Sorai: a closeness to Hsun tzu; a belief in the man-made 
character of rites and music. He concludes: "[w]ith regard to the fact that Sorai's learning is so close 
to the political thought of these utilitarian schools as almost to match it, even if there is the weakness 
that one cannot grasp clear proof, I think that one can acknowledge their influence" (p. 150). Imanaka 
suggests that the fact that Sorai does not allude to the Sung utilitarians in his formal works is due to 
the "artful convention" among Edo-period Confucians to place emphasis in their work on pre-Ch'in 
(rather than later) authorities (p. 149). However, inasmuch as Sorai seems usually to take pleasure in 
quoting from Ming scholars, this argument does not seems specially convincing. For an essay exploring 
the similarities between the thought of Yeh Shih and Sorai, see Yang 2001.Yang, however, maintains 
that `Ogyu Sorai seems not to have heard of Yeh Shih's theories' (p. 189). 
142 Fung Yu-lan 1952, pp. 298: "Although Hsun tzu ... also advocated utilitarianism, he was not so 
extreme as Mo tzu"; Schwartz 1985, pp. 299-300. 
143 Imanaka 1966, pp. 175-87. 
144 In the following section of his monograph (pp. 187-200), Imanaka adds that Sorai's late (i.e. from 
1725) concepts of the absolutist (i.e. post "three ages") "historical king" (shih-wang, cf. Hsun tzu's hou 
wang) and of the importance of the ruler controlling "names" (that is, the language of politics) were 
both shared with Hsun tzu. 
145 Ansart 1998, p. 179. 
146 Ibid., p. 180. 
147 Maruyama 1974, p. 212. 
148 Sorai praised Hsun tzu for "manifesting the theory of rites and music" to correct Mencius' empha-
sis on personal cultivation. See Moshi shiki, pp. 661/463.
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149 For Maruyama's exploration of the differences, see Maruyama 1974, pp. 112-13, note 107. 
150 Benmei, p. 241/139; Tucker 2006, p. 284; Maruyama 1974, p. 87. Sorai's condemnation of Hsiin 
tzu's doctrine was structurally necessary to his thought, because that doctrine implied the necessity of 
moral self-cultivation or education, a project deemed impracticable by Sorai and alien to his view of 
political morality. 
151 Maruyama 1974, pp. 112-13, note 107. 
152 Hsun tzu, I, p. 309; Dubs 1928, p. 115. 
153 Hsun tzu, I, p. 150; Dubs 1928, p. 53. 
154 Hsun tzu, II, p. 235; Dubs 1928, p. 306. 
155 Hsun tzu, I, pp. 624-48; Dubs 1928, pp. 173-85. 
156 Seidan, p. 445; Lidin 1999, p. 325; cf, also Maeda 1996, p. 263. 
157 Hsun tzu, II, pp. 1-5; Dubs 1928, pp. 187-9. 
158 Maeda 1996, pp. 227-78. 
159 Benmei, pp. 213-14/54; Tucker 2006, p. 187. Unity was also a theme of Hsun Tzu. See Hsun tzu, 
II, p. 186; Dubs 1928, p. 282. 
160 For references, see McMullen 2001, pp. 258-59. 
161 See above, note 86. 
162 Keishishi yoran, p. 519. Goi Ranshu suggested that Sorai read the Mo tzu "late" (Hi-Butsu hen 
[printed 1784], quoted in Ogawa 1994, p. 363); Ogawa Tamaki suggests a much earlier encounter with 
this text, "around 1706-07" (p. 371). 
163 Ogawa 1994, p. 370. 
164 Bendo, p. 201/13; Tucker 2006, p.140; Mo tzu, I, p. 149; Mei 1929, p. 30; Analects, II, 2; CC I, 
p. 146. 
165 Mo tzu, I, p. 100; Mei 1929, p. 15; Bendo, p. 202/17; Tucker 2006, p. 146. 
166 Mo tzu, I, p. 444; Mei 1929, p. 138; Benmei, p. 234/118; Tucker 2006, p. 261. 
167 Mo tzu, 1, p. 359; Mei 1929, p. 109; Rongo cho, II/20/3/83/435. 
168 Mo tzu, I, pp. 97-99; Mei 1929, p. 14; Sorai, Benmei, p. 235/120; Tucker 2006, p. 263. 
169 Keishishi yoran, p. 519. 
170 It may also be noted that in his main works on Confucian doctrine, despite its rhetorical promi-
nence in the formula "rites and music," Sorai is generally quiet on the subject of the public function of 
music, another bete-noire of Mo tzu. This does not seem simply a matter of practicability. Kumazawa 
Banzan, on whose thought Sorai draws heavily in Seidan, accorded music much greater prominence in 
his discussions of Confucian practice in Japan. 
171 Mo tzu, I, p. 174; Mei 1929, p. 41; VI,3/3/239-40/567: "The Way of learning takes the great as 
cardinal and does not adhere to the small." 
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